Mains Article

To Strengthen the Supreme Court, Divide It

Nov. 14, 2026

Context

The Supreme Court of India is the highest judicial authority and guardian of the Constitution, fundamental rights, and democratic values.
However, its expanding workload and mounting pendency have weakened its ability to perform its primary constitutional responsibilities.
Increasingly occupied with ordinary appeals, the court has struggled to address important constitutional questions.
In 2016, three Supreme Court judges raised 11 questions about the institution's functioning and referred them to a larger Bench. A decade later, the reference remains unheard.
This highlights the urgency of judicial reform and strengthens the case for dividing the Supreme Court into a Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal.

The Growing Crisis of Judicial Pendency

By the end of 2025, the Supreme Court had approximately 92,318 pending cases, its highest recorded backlog.
This represented an increase of nearly 10,000 cases over the previous year.
The problem extends beyond insufficient judicial strength to the institutional structure itself.
During the first half of the 1960s, Constitution Benches decided an average of 134 cases annually. Over the last decade, this declined to fewer than 10 cases annually.
Meanwhile, Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) under Article 136 have increasingly dominated the court's workload, accounting for approximately 84.6% of its admission docket in 2011.
Originally intended as an extraordinary remedy, Article 136 has contributed to transforming the Supreme Court into a general appellate court.
In Bihar Legal Support Society (1986), a Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati clarified that the Supreme Court was never intended to function as an ordinary court of appeal.

Recommendations of the Law Commission and Parliament

The 229th Law Commission Report (2009) recommended a Constitution Bench in Delhi alongside four regional Cassation Benches.
Similarly, a Parliamentary Standing Committee in 2023 recommended regional Benches, subsequently accepted by the Union Law Ministry.
These recommendations demonstrate that judicial restructuring has considerable institutional support.

International Experiences and Comparative Models

Several democracies successfully separate constitutional adjudication from ordinary appellate functions.
United States: The Supreme Court operates above 13 federal Courts of Appeals and considers only a small proportion of cases.
South Africa: It has a separate Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal.
Germany: Its Federal Constitutional Court exclusively handles constitutional matters, while specialised federal courts address other disputes.
Brazil: Its 1988 Constitution established a separate Superior Tribunal of Justice to handle ordinary federal appeals, relieving the Supreme Federal Tribunal of its dual responsibilities.

Importance of Judicial Filtering

Brazil's experience demonstrates that structural separation alone cannot eliminate congestion.
Effective case-selection mechanisms are equally necessary.
The U.S. Supreme Court accepts roughly 1% of the 7,000 petitions it receives annually through its discretionary review system.
Similarly, Brazil introduced the general repercussion requirement in 2004, allowing constitutional appeals only when questions have significance beyond the immediate parties.
India could adopt comparable mechanisms to prevent the proposed Constitutional Court from becoming another overburdened institution.
The 229th Law Commission Report also suggested that Article 130 could permit regional Benches without necessarily requiring a constitutional amendment.

Concerns Regarding the Division of the Supreme Court

Successive Chief Justices have opposed the proposal on grounds of institutional unity.
They argue that regional Courts of Appeal might be perceived as inferior institutions, encouraging litigants to approach the Constitutional Court in Delhi.
Such a development could create another appellate hierarchy and weaken the authority of a single final court.
Institutional coherence, judicial independence, and consistency of judgments must therefore remain central considerations.

The Way Forward: Restoring the Court

Addressing the Illusion of Institutional Unity
- The existing Supreme Court already functions through numerous small Benches, sometimes delivering contradictory judgments.
- Its constitutional responsibilities receive inadequate attention because of excessive appellate litigation.
- Thus, institutional unity is increasingly theoretical. A separate Constitutional Court could restore coherence by concentrating on questions affecting the entire Republic.
Steps Beyond Increasing Judicial Strength
- Expanding judicial strength has not resolved the problem. When the sanctioned strength increased to 34 judges in 2019, pendency stood at approximately 60,000 cases.
- By the end of 2025, it had reached nearly 93,000.
- During 2025, the court disposed of 65,615 cases, while 75,410 fresh matters arrived. In 2026, Parliament increased its sanctioned strength to 38 judges.
- These figures demonstrate that appointing additional judges without restructuring judicial responsibilities cannot provide a lasting solution.
- The priority must be rationalising the distribution of judicial work.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's mounting pendency reflects a deeper institutional crisis affecting constitutional adjudication and access to justice.
Establishing a dedicated Constitutional Court and regional Courts of Appeal, supported by effective case-filtering mechanisms, offers a practical solution.
Although concerns about institutional unity require safeguards, preserving the existing structure is unlikely to resolve the crisis.
Judicial specialisation, constitutional accountability, institutional efficiency, and speedy justice must guide reform.
Restructuring would not diminish the Supreme Court's authority but restore its constitutional purpose while ensuring accessible and timely justice for ordinary citizens.