Why in news?

• India is reconsidering its energy security strategy after disruptions in liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the West Asia conflict.
• The crisis has highlighted India’s limited LNG storage capacity, prompting both the government and industry stakeholders to plan expansions.
• Petronet LNG stated that the company aims to increase its storage capacity by about 70% by adding new cryogenic tanks at terminals like Dahej, Kochi, and the upcoming Gopalpur facility.
  • Petronet LNG is India’s largest LNG importer, established in 1998 as a joint venture by major public sector oil companies such as GAIL, BPCL, IOCL, and ONGC.
  • It handles about 74–75% of the country’s LNG imports and operates key import and regasification terminals at Dahej (Gujarat) and Kochi (Kerala).
• Currently, unlike crude oil, India has minimal LNG reserves, leading to discussions on building adequate stockpiles to better withstand future geopolitical and supply shocks.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Lessons from the Hormuz Crisis: India’s LNG Vulnerability
• Expanding LNG Infrastructure: Challenges and Way Forward
• India’s LNG Import Shift: Diversification Amid Hormuz Disruption

Lessons from the Hormuz Crisis: India’s LNG Vulnerability

• Heavy Dependence on Hormuz Route - India relies on LNG imports for nearly half of its natural gas needs, with around 60% of supplies routed through the Strait of Hormuz.
• Supply Disruptions and Immediate Impact - The West Asia conflict led to a near halt in vessel movement through the Strait, resulting in no LNG cargo reaching India from the Persian Gulf for over two months. This severely disrupted supply chains despite efforts to source LNG from alternative markets.
• Rationing and Sectoral Prioritisation - With limited supplies, the government prioritised natural gas for essential sectors like transportation and household use, while curtailing supply to certain industries, highlighting the strain on domestic energy management.
• Inadequate Storage Capacity - India currently has 23 LNG storage tanks, including those operated by Petronet LNG, but these are primarily designed for operational continuity rather than emergency reserves. Each tank holds roughly one shipload, while daily consumption exceeds one tank.

Expanding LNG Infrastructure: Challenges and Way Forward

• High Cost and Long Gestation Period
  • Building LNG storage tanks is a complex and expensive process because they must be cryogenic, capable of maintaining extremely low temperatures to keep gas in liquid form.
  • Each tank can take at least three years to construct after approvals, making expansion a long-term effort.
• How LNG Storage and Supply Works?
  • Natural gas is cooled into LNG and transported via specialised cryogenic vessels.
  • It is then stored in cryogenic tanks at terminals, where it is regasified and supplied to consumers through pipelines.
• Pipeline Connectivity as a Key Constraint
  • Beyond storage, inadequate pipeline infrastructure limits the efficient use of LNG terminals.
  • Some terminals operate below capacity due to poor connectivity, restricting the evacuation of gas to end users.
• Way Forward: Integrated Infrastructure Development
  • Improving pipeline networks alongside increasing storage capacity will enhance utilisation of LNG terminals, strengthen supply chains, and help India build a more resilient energy system against future disruptions.

India’s LNG Import Shift: Diversification Amid Hormuz Disruption

• India’s LNG sourcing saw a sharp disruption in early 2026 as key suppliers like Qatar and the UAE dropped out due to the Strait of Hormuz crisis.
• Qatar supplies plunged from 1.055 million tonnes in January to 765,000 tonnes in February and just 60,000 tonnes in March before falling to zero in April, marking a 100% decline over three months.
• Similarly, UAE shipments dropped from 403,000 tonnes in January to 131,000 tonnes in March and to zero in April.
• Rise of Alternative Suppliers
  • In response, India rapidly diversified its import basket.
  • Countries like Oman, Nigeria, and Angola significantly increased shipments, while new and smaller suppliers such as Mauritania, Australia, Indonesia, Cameroon, and the Republic of the Congo entered the mix.
  • The United States also expanded its role, reflecting a growing reliance on spot LNG markets.
  • Overall LNG imports stood at 1.947 million tonnes in April, up from 1.673 million tonnes in March (a 16% rise), but still significantly lower than 2.577 million tonnes in January, reflecting lingering supply tightness.

Why in news?

The Model Code of Conduct (MCC), a set of guidelines for political parties during elections, originated in Kerala in 1960 and was later formalised by the Election Commission in 1968, with revisions in 1974 and provisions for the “party in power” added in 1979. Its strict enforcement began under T. N. Seshan in 1991.

Recently, PM Modi’s April 18 address has sparked debate over a possible violation of the MCC.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Evolution of the Model Code of Conduct and Recent Controversy
• PM’s Broadcast and MCC: Legal and Ethical Questions
• PM’s Broadcast and Electoral Law: What Courts and Statutes Say?

Evolution of the Model Code of Conduct and Recent Controversy

• The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) has evolved through judicial interpretation and electoral practice.
• In the Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, the Supreme Court described Article 324 as a “reservoir of power,” enabling the Election Commission to act where laws are absent.
• Later, the Harbans Singh Jalal v. Union of India clarified that the MCC comes into force from the announcement of the election schedule.
• The Code allows for sanctions ranging from censure to suspension of party recognition.
• Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s televised address, where he criticised Opposition parties and appealed to voters, has raised concerns about potential violations of the MCC.

PM’s Broadcast and MCC: Legal and Ethical Questions

• The Model Code of Conduct restricts the party in power from using official resources for electoral advantage.
• Clauses 1(a), 1(b), and 4 of Part VII prohibit combining official duties with campaigning, misusing government machinery, and exploiting publicly funded media for partisan purposes.
• Concerns Raised by the Broadcast
  • The Prime Minister’s April 18 address, broadcast on state-run platforms, has raised concerns as it appears to fall within the scope of these restrictions.
  • The issue centres on whether public resources were used for political messaging, making it a potential violation under Part VII of the MCC.
  • However, the Election Commission has not yet taken action on related complaints.
• Legal Dimension: Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Unlike the MCC, the law under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is more specific.
  • Section 123(3) defines a “corrupt practice” as appealing to voters based on religion, caste, community, race, or language.
  • In the Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen judgment, the Supreme Court clarified that such appeals apply to both candidates and voters.
  • While the MCC provides flexible guidelines to ensure fairness, the legal provisions impose stricter boundaries.
  • The controversy over the broadcast lies at the intersection of these frameworks, raising questions about both ethical conduct and statutory compliance during elections.

PM’s Broadcast and Electoral Law: What Courts and Statutes Say

• Judicial interpretation, especially in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, clarified that Section 123(3) of the RPA focuses on appeals based on religion, caste, community, race, or language.
• However, it does not cover broader political messaging such as gender-based appeals or party-targeted campaigning, leaving gaps in its applicability to the April 18 broadcast.
• A New Legal Route: Section 123(7)
  • A pending petition in the court invokes Section 123(7), which prohibits using government officials or machinery to advance electoral prospects.
  • The petition argues that the use of public broadcasters like Doordarshan and Sansad TV, along with PMO resources, may fall under this provision.
• Statute vs Code: Different Scopes
  • While the law narrowly defines “corrupt practices,” focusing on specific grounds or misuse of official assistance, the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is broader and examines the use of public resources by the party in power.
  • Thus, the broadcast may escape strict statutory violation but still raise concerns under the MCC.
• Regulatory Dilemma and Enforcement Challenge
  • The Election Commission’s inaction highlights a larger issue: the gap between rigid statutory provisions and the MCC’s flexible framework.
  • If the Supreme Court admits the petition, it could test the boundaries of electoral law and redefine how such cases are addressed in the future.

Why in the News?

• The Allahabad High Court has ruled that the Forest Rights Act, 2006, overrides all earlier conflicting laws and court orders, striking down a District Level Committee decision that had denied the Tharu tribe’s forest rights in Uttar Pradesh.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About FRA (Basics, Key Objectives, Major Rights, etc.)
• News Summary

About the Forest Rights Act, 2006

• The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, commonly called the Forest Rights Act (FRA), was enacted to correct the historical injustice faced by forest-dwelling communities.
• The law recognises the rights of tribal and traditional forest dwellers to inhabit and use forest land for livelihood and cultural purposes.

Key Objectives

• Recognition of Forest Rights: To legally acknowledge individual and community rights of forest dwellers over forest land and resources.
• Empowering Gram Sabhas: To make the Gram Sabha the grassroots authority to initiate the process for determining forest rights.
• Promoting Ecological Balance: To integrate tribal rights with forest conservation.
• Democratic Decentralisation: To devolve decision-making to forest-dwelling communities.

Major Rights Under the FRA

• Title Rights: Ownership of land cultivated by forest dwellers, up to a maximum of 4 hectares per household.
• Community Forest Rights: Rights to collect, use, and dispose of non-timber forest produce such as honey, bamboo, and medicinal plants.
• Habitat Rights: Recognition of traditional habitats and settlement rights for Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs).
• Grazing and Fishing Rights: Rights to graze cattle and access water bodies for fishing within forest areas.
• Conservation Rights: Right to protect and conserve traditional forest and wildlife resources.
• Protection Against Eviction: Forest dwellers cannot be evicted until the recognition and verification process of claims is complete.
• The Act provides that its provisions apply notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, giving it overriding authority over older legislations like the Indian Forest Act, 1927, or various State forest laws.

News Summary

• Recently, the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court issued an important judgment reinforcing the primacy of the Forest Rights Act.
• The court set aside a District Level Committee (DLC) decision from March 2021 that had rejected the forest rights claims of the Tharu tribal community in Palia Kalan Tehsil, Lakhimpur district, Uttar Pradesh.

Basis of the DLC Decision

• The DLC had relied on a 2000 Supreme Court interim order that prohibited the de-reservation or reclassification of forests, sanctuaries, or national parks.
• Citing this older order, the DLC denied the Tharus’ claims, despite the FRA’s later enactment in 2006 that explicitly recognised such rights.

Court’s Reasoning

• The High Court reminded the DLC that any court order or legal provision inconsistent with a later law becomes null and void.
• Since the FRA came into effect after the Supreme Court’s 2000 interim order, its provisions prevail.
• The judges further highlighted that Section 4 of the FRA specifically states that forest rights are vested in dwellers “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.”
• In doing so, the court reaffirmed a core legal principle: a later, special law supersedes earlier, conflicting laws or orders, bringing relief to forest communities across India.

Procedural Irregularity

• While the FRA provides a mechanism to hold violating authorities accountable, the High Court stopped short of invoking it.
• Under the Act, the Gram Sabha must issue a 60-day notice to the State-Level Monitoring Committee to act against authorities that ignore FRA provisions.
• Instead, the court directed the same DLC, which had erred earlier, to reconsider its decision in light of the FRA, a step not explicitly provided for in the Act.

Broader Legal Context and Relevance

• Protection from Eviction
  • The High Court also emphasised a legal safeguard under the FRA, no forest dweller can be evicted from their land until their claims are verified.
  • Similar enforcement has been seen elsewhere; for instance, in January 2026, the Uttarakhand High Court instructed the forest department to refrain from coercive actions against forest dwellers until their claims were fully adjudicated.
  • However, violations remain widespread. Several Madras High Court rulings over the past decade dismissed forest dwellers’ petitions, prioritising state forest laws such as the Tamil Nadu Forest Act (TNFA), 1882, even though the FRA should have prevailed.
  • Authorities have continued issuing eviction and cattle-grazing bans contrary to the FRA’s protective clauses.
• Grazing Rights and FRA Supremacy
  • A notable example came from the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, which in 2022 upheld prohibitions on cattle grazing inside forests under TNFA provisions, later limiting the ban to protected areas like tiger reserves and sanctuaries.
  • Yet, the FRA explicitly recognises grazing rights even within such protected areas, as it is a central law overriding state legislation.
  • Thus, the Allahabad High Court ruling marks a progressive departure from these earlier restrictive interpretations, reaffirming the sovereignty of the FRA over conflicting state laws and older judicial orders.

Why in News?

• India’s maritime sector is the backbone of its external trade, with nearly 95% of trade by volume and 70% by value transported through sea routes.
• Efficient port governance is therefore critical for logistics performance, export competitiveness, and economic growth.
• Traditionally, major ports operated under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, a model that ensured public accountability but has become increasingly outdated in a globalised, technology-driven logistics ecosystem.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Need for Reform - Structural Limitations of the Old Model
• Corporatisation as a Reform Strategy
• Evidence of Success - Kamarajar Port Model
• Rationale Behind Corporatisation
• Global Best Practices
• Challenges and Concerns
• Way Forward
• Conclusion

Need for Reform - Structural Limitations of the Old Model:

• Bureaucratic delays in decision-making.
• Limited financial autonomy restricting investment.
• Slow infrastructure expansion.
• Inability to compete with efficient private ports.
• Weak integration with modern logistics and supply chains.

Corporatisation as a Reform Strategy:

• The Major Port Authorities Act, 2021 introduces corporatised governance for major ports.
• Key clarification:
  • Corporatisation does not mean privatisation.
  • Ports remain publicly owned but gain commercial autonomy, professional management, and financial flexibility.
• Objectives of corporatisation:
  • Improve operational efficiency
  • Enhance global competitiveness
  • Attract private and institutional investment
  • Enable ports to evolve into integrated logistics hubs

Evidence of Success - Kamarajar Port Model:

• Kamarajar Port (Ennore, Tamil Nadu), established as a corporatised entity in 2001.
• It demonstrates:
  • Improved operational efficiency
  • Better investment mobilisation
  • Enhanced strategic decision-making
• This success influenced broader sectoral reforms.

Rationale Behind Corporatisation:

• Global competitiveness:
  • Ports are now multimodal logistics hubs, which require integration with digital systems, inland transport, and supply chains.
  • Without reform, Indian ports risk marginalisation in global shipping networks.
• Financial autonomy:
  • High capital requirements for deep-water berths, container terminals, and digital infrastructure.
  • Corporatised ports can access financial markets, and enter public-private partnerships (PPPs).
• Faster decision-making: Reduced bureaucratic layers, quicker decisions on tariffs, investments, and operations.
• Alignment with national initiatives: Supports flagship programmes like Sagarmala Programme, National Logistics Policy, PM Gati Shakti, and facilitates development of integrated, multimodal logistics ecosystems.

Global Best Practices:

• Port of Rotterdam: Corporatised public entity balancing efficiency and state oversight.
• PSA International (Singapore): Government-linked corporation with global leadership in port operations.
• United Kingdom model: Fully privatised system showing efficiency gains but less suited to strategic infrastructure control.

Challenges and Concerns:

• Workforce resistance: Fear of job insecurity and loss of benefits.
• Skill gaps: Transition to automation and digital logistics requires continuous reskilling and upskilling.
• Risk of commercial overreach: Balancing profit motives with public interest remains critical.
• Governance and accountability: Ensuring transparency despite increased autonomy.

Way Forward:

• Inclusive reform approach: Need for stakeholder consultation and trust-building. Engage employees as stakeholders through dialogue and safeguards.
• Capacity building: Invest in training, reskilling, and digital literacy.
• Robust regulatory framework: Maintain checks and balances to prevent misuse of autonomy.
• Public-private synergy: Leverage PPP models without compromising strategic control.
• Technology integration: Promote automation, AI, and digital logistics platforms.

Conclusion:

• Corporatisation of India’s major ports marks a strategic shift from bureaucratic administration to performance-driven governance.
• By combining public ownership with commercial flexibility, it offers a balanced pathway to enhance efficiency, attract investment, and integrate with global supply chains.
• However, its success will depend on careful implementation, workforce inclusion, and strong regulatory oversight, ensuring that economic gains align with broader national interests.

Context

• Global energy systems are deeply influenced by geopolitical crises, and history shows that such disruptions often lead to institutional innovation.
• The recent energy shocks following the Ukraine conflict and the closure of key maritime routes highlight Asia’s vulnerability to external supply disruptions.
• Drawing from historical precedent, particularly the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA), it is important to examine the idea for the creation of a new regional institution, the Asian Energy Collaborative Compact (AECC), to address Asia’s evolving energy security challenges.

Historical Context: Lessons from the 1973 Oil Crisis

• The Impact of the Yom Kippur War
  • The Yom Kippur War triggered a global oil crisis when Arab oil producers imposed an embargo, causing crude oil prices to surge dramatically.
  • This led to a worldwide economic recession and exposed the vulnerability of oil-importing nations.
• Formation of the IEA
  • In response, Henry Kissinger convened Western leaders to create a coordinated mechanism to counter producer cartels like OAPEC.
  • The result was the IEA, which provided collective energy security, market intelligence, and crisis management.

Contemporary Crisis: Strait of Hormuz Closure

• Immediate Economic and Energy Impacts
  • The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted global oil flows, particularly affecting Asia, which relies heavily on imported energy.
  • Millions of barrels of oil have been stranded, leading to shortages and emergency measures across countries like India, Japan, and the Philippines.
• Exposure to Maritime Chokepoints
  • This crisis has underscored Asia’s dependence on vulnerable sea routes, including the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea.
  • Although governed by international norms under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), these routes remain susceptible to geopolitical tensions and disruptions.

The Need for a Regional Response

• Shared Vulnerabilities Across Asia
  • Despite differences in political systems and economic development, Asian countries share common concerns regarding energy security and supply chain resilience.
  • These shared vulnerabilities create a strong basis for regional cooperation.
• Limitations of Existing Institutions
  • While the IEA plays a crucial role in global energy governance, its alignment with Western economies limits its effectiveness in addressing Asia-specific challenges.
  • This gap necessitates a dedicated regional institution.

The Objectives of Asian Energy Collaborative Compact (AECC)

• Safeguarding Maritime Navigation
  • The AECC would work to ensure free and secure passage through critical maritime routes, protecting the principle of innocent passage and reducing risks associated with chokepoints.
• Strengthening Collective Bargaining Power
  • By aggregating demand, Asian countries could negotiate better pricing and terms with energy exporters.
  • Addressing the Asian Premium would reduce costs and enhance market efficiency.
• Accelerating the Green Energy Transition
  • The AECC would facilitate collaboration in renewable energy by pooling technological, financial, and human resources.
  • It would act as a think tank to identify synergies and promote sustainable energy solutions.

Challenges to Implementation

• Political and Strategic Diversity
  • Asia’s diversity in governance systems and geopolitical interests may hinder unified action.
  • Unlike the Western bloc that formed the IEA, Asia lacks a cohesive political framework.
• Balancing Sovereignty and Cooperation
  • While collective negotiation offers advantages, countries may be reluctant to compromise their autonomy in energy policy and trade decisions.

Future Outlook: Transitioning Beyond Fossil Fuels

• The instability in global oil markets, highlighted by shifts within producer groups, reinforces the urgency of transitioning to renewable energy.
• Although progress has been made, no Asian country has yet achieved dominance of renewables in its energy mix.
• The AECC could play a pivotal role in accelerating this transition through coordinated strategies and shared innovation.

Conclusion

• The evolving geopolitical landscape and recent energy disruptions underscore the need for a coordinated Asian response to energy security.
• Drawing lessons from the past, the proposed Asian Energy Collaborative Compact offers a strategic framework to address shared challenges.
• By enhancing maritime security, strengthening bargaining power, and promoting renewable energy collaboration, the AECC could significantly improve Asia’s resilience and sustainability in an uncertain global energy environment.