Why in news?

India's GDP numbers have once again sparked debate. The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) has revised past growth rates going as far back as 2023-24, with some revised upward and others downward.

The short answer for these changes is "using PPI for double deflation". This article explains, in simple terms, how GDP data is compiled, why it gets revised, and what changed in India's methodology in 2026.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Why GDP Data Gets Revised Regularly?
• The 2026 Base Year Revision
• How GDP Is Calculated?
• Single Deflation: The Old Method
• Double Deflation: The New Method
• What Double Deflation Implies?
• The Shift to PPI
• Remaining Limitations

Why GDP Data Gets Revised Regularly

• Revisions to past GDP numbers, especially quarterly ones, are routine. This is because quarterly and annual estimates are built differently:
  • Quarterly estimates use a "benchmark-indicator approach".
    • Movement in quarterly GDP is guided by high-frequency indicators such as crop production, cement production, finished steel consumption and commercial vehicle sales.
  • Annual estimates are based on actual output data.
    • As more actual data becomes available from company financial results and MoSPI surveys, quarterly estimates are revised.
  • This explains the large upward revision in growth for January-March 2026 (Q4 of FY26), from 7.8 per cent to 8.6 per cent.
  • However, changes to older data happened mainly because MoSPI shifted to a new indicator, the Producer Price Index (PPI), to convert nominal GDP into real GDP.

The 2026 Base Year Revision

• In February 2026, MoSPI released a new GDP series after changing the base year from 2011-12 to 2022-23.
• Every economy revises its base year periodically to include new data sources, improve methodology and capture the economy more accurately.
• During this rebasing, MoSPI also overhauled how it removes the effect of inflation from nominal GDP to arrive at real GDP.

How GDP Is Calculated?

• GDP is the sum of Gross Value Added (GVA) by each sector, plus indirect taxes collected by the government, minus subsidies.
• GVA is the difference between the value of what a sector produces (output) and the raw materials it uses (inputs).
• At current prices, this is called nominal GVA. The difficulty arises in calculating real GVA, which requires removing inflation.

Single Deflation: The Old Method

• Under the old series, the value of inputs and outputs for each sector was deflated by the same number, except for agriculture and mining and quarrying.
• This deflator was either the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) or one of their sub-indices.
• The real input value was then subtracted from the real output value to get real GVA. This is called single deflation.
• Single deflation works well only when input and output prices move at the same rate. When they diverge, it produces errors.

Double Deflation: The New Method

• In double deflation, inputs are adjusted by input inflation and outputs by output inflation. This gives a more accurate real GVA.
• MoSPI adopted double deflation in the 2022-23 series after repeated criticism that single deflation was either underestimating or overestimating real growth.
• Example Illustrating the Difference
  • A sector uses Rs 100 of inputs to produce Rs 200 of output. Nominal GVA is Rs 100.
  • Next year, inputs and outputs both rise 20 per cent to Rs 120 and Rs 240. Nominal GVA is Rs 120, a growth of 20 per cent.
  • Assume input prices rose 5 per cent and output prices rose 2 per cent.
  • Single deflation (using a common 3 per cent deflator): Real GVA is Rs 116.5, growth is 16.5 per cent, deflator is 3 per cent.
  • Double deflation (5 per cent for inputs, 2 per cent for outputs): Real GVA is Rs 121, growth is 21 per cent, deflator is -0.8 per cent.

What Double Deflation Implies?

• Two key points emerge:
  • When input prices rise faster than output prices, single deflation underestimates real GVA growth.
  • A negative implicit deflator ensures that when nominal growth is low because firms have not fully passed on higher costs to consumers, real growth is not wrongly penalised.
  • This was the case in April-June 2026, when nominal growth was 10.3 per cent.
• This also explains why the manufacturing deflator has been negative in six of the 13 quarters since April-June 2023.
• The manufacturing deflator moves inversely with crude oil prices, a crucial input. When oil prices rise, the deflator falls.
  • Economists note that a negative deflator signals strong pipeline price pressures.
  • If firms have pricing power, these costs will be passed on later, raising nominal growth while real growth may soften.

The Shift to PPI

• When the new GDP series first came out in February, inflation was removed from the numbers using the CPI (retail prices), the WPI (wholesale prices) and their sub-indices.
• The latest revisions happened because MoSPI has now switched to the Producer Price Index (PPI).
  • The PPI captures the price a producer actually receives at the factory gate.
  • It leaves out taxes and the margins added by traders and transporters.
  • It is therefore a cleaner measure of what producers earn.
• Why does the choice of index matter so much?
  • Because each sector's inputs and outputs must be adjusted using an index that reflects that sector's own prices.
  • The old series failed to do this for services. In July-September 2025, the last quarter under the old series, the services sector's inflation was shown as just 1.2 per cent.
  • This was far too low. The reason was that the WPI was used to adjust services GVA, but the WPI tracks only goods and has no services in it at all. The result was a distortion.
    • When commodity prices were soft, wholesale inflation was low.
    • Services GVA was then adjusted by a number much smaller than the real price rise in services.
    • This made real services growth look higher than it actually was. When commodity prices shot up, the opposite happened, and services growth looked lower than it really was.
  • With PPIs, MoSPI now has more than 300 separate deflators to work with, compared to about 180 in the old series.
  • In simple terms, more sectors and sub-sectors are now adjusted using their own correct price index, so GVA is being measured more accurately.

Remaining Limitations

• The new methodology does not mean India's GDP numbers are perfect. The input PPI is still at a trial stage and exists only for manufacturing.
• Greater clarity will come when MoSPI publishes its "Sources and Methods" document later this month, detailing the compilation, data sources and methodologies of the new series.

Why in news?

Recently, the United Kingdom announced a ban on imports of all goods originating from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank.

Addressing the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband declared Israel's occupation unlawful and said the British government believed "ethnic cleansing" of Palestinians was taking place in parts of the West Bank, carried out by "settler terrorists".

The UK sees the move as a response to what it believes is a clear Israeli attempt to bury the two-state solution.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What the UK Has Banned?
• International Support
• Why Now: The E1 Corridor Trigger
• Territorial Structure of the West Bank
• What Settlements Produce?
• Economic Impact on Israel

What the UK Has Banned?

• The measures go beyond goods and cover services, finance and sanctions:
  • Import ban: All agricultural, processed and manufactured goods produced in Israeli settlements across the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are barred from the UK market.
  • Services ban: British firms cannot provide services that facilitate settlement expansion, including construction, infrastructure, real estate, advertising and financing.
  • Export licences: The UK will refuse licence applications for arms and other exports that materially contribute to the occupation.
  • Sanctions: Sanctions against settler organisations and individuals involved in violence and settlement expansion will be expanded.

International Support

• UK’s announcement was followed by a joint statement by 12 countries, including Canada and France, supporting the two-state solution and backing trade restrictions on illegal settlements.
• The UK, Canada and France committed to introducing national restrictions, while some other countries said they were still considering measures.

Why Now: The E1 Corridor Trigger

• The immediate trigger is Israel's approval of new construction in sensitive zones, notably the "E1 corridor" between East Jerusalem and the Ma'ale Adumim settlement.
• Construction in E1 would:
  • Sever the territorial link between the northern and southern West Bank.
  • Further isolate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.
  • Physically fragment the territory claimed for a future Palestinian state.

The Legal Backdrop: ICJ Advisory Opinion

• The decision rests on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion of July
• The court held that Israel's continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful.
• It also found that Israel's transfer of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and maintaining their presence there, violates Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
• Crucially, paragraph 278 of the ruling placed obligations on third-party states.
• They must refrain from recognising the situation arising from Israel's unlawful presence as legal, and must avoid rendering aid or assistance in maintaining it.
• The UK's ban can be seen as compliance with this obligation.

Territorial Structure of the West Bank

• The 1995 Oslo II Accord divided the West Bank into Areas A, B and C.
• Area C covers roughly 60 per cent of the West Bank, remains under full Israeli civil and military control, and houses almost all Israeli settlements outside Jerusalem.
• Jordan Valley and Dead Sea Basin: Cover nearly 30 per cent of the West Bank and are dominated by Israeli agricultural settlements. Palestinian land has been converted into industrial date plantations and commercial farms.

What Settlements Produce

• Settlement production relies on commercial agriculture and light manufacturing:
  • Agricultural goods: Medjool dates (the Jordan Valley holds a significant share of global exports), table grapes, herbs, citrus fruits, avocados and wine from the West Bank and Golan Heights.
  • Manufactured goods: Cosmetics using Dead Sea minerals, plastics, textiles, construction materials and packaging, produced in industrial parks such as Barkan, Mishor Adumim and Atarot.

Economic Impact on Israel

• A 2022 UNCTAD report estimated that settlements in Area C and East Jerusalem contributed about $30 billion annually (in constant 2015 dollars) to Israel's economy between 2000 and 2020. However, direct settlement exports form only 1 to 2 per cent of Israel's total exports.
• With a GDP above $500 billion, driven by high-technology, defence hardware and pharmaceuticals produced within pre-1967 lines, Israel's macroeconomy will not be destabilised.
• The impact will be felt by specialised settlement businesses, especially date growers in the Jordan Valley and manufacturers in Barkan.

Impact on Palestinian Workers

• The relationship between Palestinian labour and the settlement economy is complex.
• According to the ILO, around 40,000 Palestinians worked in settlements in Area C before the October 7, 2023 attacks, mainly in construction, agriculture and factory labour.
• Critics of the ban argue it may harm Palestinian workers by removing higher-paying jobs, causing immediate income loss amid high unemployment.
• Palestinian civil society and trade unions counter that settlement employment is a form of captive labour born of structural dependency.
• Activists argue that ending the economic viability of settlements will help reclaim occupied land and build long-term economic sovereignty.

Context:

• Ahead of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, Saeed bin Mubarak Al Hajeri, Minister of State at the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlines how the UAE approaches BRICS.
• The UAE became a full member of BRICS in January 2024. Its engagement rests on one simple principle: economic cooperation must create tangible opportunities for countries, businesses and people.
• In a world of growing complexity and uncertainty, the value of international cooperation must be measured by its ability to deliver stability, resilience and shared prosperity.

Diversity as the Strength of BRICS

• BRICS draws strength from its diversity. Its members have different economic structures, resources, capabilities and development experiences. They include:
  • Major producers and consumers
  • Sources of capital and investment destinations
  • Energy exporters
  • Manufacturing centres
• These differences create room for complementarity. Markets, capital, capabilities and ideas can be connected in ways that benefit members and, by extension, the wider Global South.

The UAE's Approach to BRICS

• The UAE's participation in BRICS flows from its broader commitment to multilateralism, constructive dialogue and diversified international partnerships.
• It seeks to build bridges between economies and regions. It supports an open international system that promotes peace, stability, sustainable development and shared prosperity.
• For the UAE, the real value of BRICS lies in implementation. Dialogue must translate into easier trade, stronger investment flows, more resilient supply chains, better connectivity and greater opportunities for businesses.

Relevance of India's 2026 Chairship

• India's BRICS Chairship is centred on four pillars: resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability. Analysts see this as a timely framework.
• Trade restrictions, supply-chain disruptions and uncertainty are raising costs for businesses and consumers.
• The right response, as per the experts, is not to retreat from global economic integration but to make it more resilient and inclusive.
• BRICS can deliver tangible benefits in five areas:
  • Strengthening the multilateral trading system
  • Facilitating trade and investment
  • Improving connectivity
  • Supporting resilient global value chains
  • Promoting sustainable development

Development Finance and the New Development Bank

• Development finance is a key part of this agenda. The New Development Bank (NDB) has approved more than $40 billion in financing since its establishment.
• This has supported infrastructure and sustainable development across member countries.
• The UAE engaged actively with the NDB long before joining BRICS, reflecting its commitment to mobilising capital for productive investment and long-term growth.

UAE-India Partnership as a Model

• The UAE-India relationship shows what practical connectivity can achieve.
• The UAE-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has created a more enabling environment for trade and investment between two highly complementary economies.
• Key figures:
  • Non-oil bilateral trade grew by 17 per cent in 2025 to exceed $76 billion.
  • The two countries aim to raise bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2032.
• The relationship goes beyond trade. It is reinforced by investment, innovation, education, tourism and long-standing links between businesses, institutions and people.

The Broader Lesson: Connectivity Across Societies

• The UAE-India experience offers a lesson for BRICS. The strongest economic partnerships are built not only through agreements between governments but through lasting connections across societies.
• These create trust, opportunity and resilience, allowing commercial ties to deepen over time.
• Economic connectivity grows when businesses, entrepreneurs, investors and institutions become familiar with one another.
• It is strengthened through education, research, tourism, cultural exchange and engagement of younger generations.
• The opportunity for BRICS is to deepen the quality of connectivity among members, linking not just economies but also institutions, ideas and people.

The UAE's Advantages as a Connector

• The UAE is well placed to contribute because connectivity lies at the heart of its own economic model. Its strengths include:
  • Non-oil sectors accounted for almost 79 per cent of GDP in 2025.
  • World-class infrastructure, trusted financial institutions, advanced logistics and energy capabilities.
  • An open investment environment that helps businesses scale up and expand outward.
  • Ports, airports and logistics networks connecting markets across Asia, Africa, Europe and beyond.
  • Financial centres linking international capital with regional opportunities.
  • Universities, research institutions and an innovation ecosystem connecting talent and ideas.
  • Sovereign wealth assets exceeding $2.9 trillion.
  • 38 concluded Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements.
• For the UAE, connectivity is not merely about moving goods between markets. It is about creating conditions in which capital, knowledge, technology, talent and people can interact and generate new opportunities.
• Its approach builds cooperation around connectivity, not division.

The Path Ahead

• As India leads BRICS through 2026, experts see an opportunity to move towards delivery: building resilience without closing markets, supporting innovation while widening opportunity, and strengthening ties among businesses, institutions and people.
• The UAE also looks forward to China's BRICS Chairship in 2027, hoping to carry forward the same spirit of openness, connectivity and practical cooperation.
• Ultimately, the success of BRICS will be measured by the opportunities it creates.

Conclusion

• The UAE presents BRICS as a platform for practical economic cooperation rather than geopolitical division.
• Its emphasis on connectivity, implementation and people-to-people ties aligns well with India's 2026 chairship agenda.
• The UAE-India partnership, driven by CEPA and ambitious trade targets, offers a working model of how BRICS members can convert dialogue into shared prosperity.

Why in the News?

• A working paper by World Resources Institute (WRI) India has found that open waste burning across Indian cities rises sharply in winter, with incidence, quantity burned and associated emissions as much as three times higher than in summer.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About Open Waste Burning
• News Summary (Key Findings of the Report by WRI, Significance, Way Forward)

About Open Waste Burning

• Open waste burning refers to the uncontrolled burning of municipal solid waste in the open, on streets, near dumpsites, in vacant plots or at collection points, rather than through regulated disposal or treatment.
• It typically occurs where waste collection is irregular or absent, leaving residents and informal workers to dispose of accumulated garbage by setting it alight.
• The practice releases a mix of pollutants, including particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), carbon monoxide, dioxins and furans, depending on the composition of the waste. Plastics, rubber and treated materials produce particularly toxic emissions.
• Open burning of solid waste is prohibited under the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016, which place responsibility on urban local bodies for door-to-door collection, segregation and scientific disposal.

News Summary

• The study is based on field surveys conducted between 2019 and 2026 across 11 polluted Indian cities, whose names have not been disclosed.
• The Winter Spike
  • The central finding is a sharp seasonal increase. Average incidence, quantity of waste burned, and associated emissions are up to three times higher in winter than in summer.
  • This timing compounds the problem. The findings come as cities approach the post-monsoon period, when falling temperatures and stagnant atmospheric conditions make it harder for pollutants to disperse.
  • Emissions released during this period remain concentrated closer to the ground and linger longer.
• Variation Across City Tiers
  • The study categorised cities by size and found differing patterns.
  • Tier 2 cities, those with populations between 500,000 and five million, recorded the highest quantities of waste burned among the cities examined.
  • Tier 3 cities, however, recorded the highest winter incidence of burning:

• Tier 3 cities: 49.6 incidents per square kilometre per day
• Tier 2 cities: 46 incidents per square kilometre per day
• Tier 1 cities: 39.4 incidents per square kilometre per day

• The pattern suggests that smaller cities, which typically have weaker municipal waste infrastructure, see burning occur more frequently, while larger Tier 2 cities generate greater volumes of burned waste overall.

The Exposure Problem

• Open waste burning was not the dominant source of citywide particulate pollution. It contributed less than 1% of total citywide PM2.5 and PM10 emissions in the cities assessed.
• Yet the study cautions against dismissing it on that basis.
• Because burning happens closer to homes, streets and waste dumps, it can significantly increase short-term exposure to toxic smoke for those living nearby.
• This distinction between aggregate emissions and localised exposure is significant. A source may contribute little to a city's overall pollution average while still posing serious health risks to the specific populations living around it.

The Equity Dimension

• The study found that the burden was strongly associated with socio-economic conditions. Poorer areas recorded substantially more burning than higher-income areas.
• The highest incidence recorded in the entire study, nearly 84 incidents per square kilometre per day, was in the poorer areas of Tier 2 cities during winter. This is well above the Tier 2 city average of 46 incidents.
• Researchers attribute this pattern to disparities in waste collection and other municipal services. Where formal collection is irregular or does not reach at all, residents have few alternatives to burning accumulated waste.
• The result is a double disadvantage. Lower-income neighbourhoods receive poorer municipal services, and then absorb the health consequences of the disposal methods that gap forces upon them.

Why This Matters?

• Public Health
  • Open burning produces pollutants at breathing height in residential areas, unlike emissions from tall industrial stacks that disperse more widely.
  • Exposure risks include respiratory illness, cardiovascular stress and, in the case of plastic combustion, exposure to carcinogenic compounds.
  • Vulnerable groups, children, the elderly, informal waste workers and street vendors, face the greatest exposure.
• Municipal Governance
  • The findings point to a service delivery failure rather than merely a behavioural problem.
  • Burning is largely a consequence of waste not being collected, which places the issue squarely within the responsibility of urban local bodies.
• Winter Air Quality Management
  • Most winter air quality action plans in India focus on vehicular emissions, industrial sources, construction dust and crop residue burning.
  • Open waste burning receives comparatively less attention, partly because its citywide contribution appears small.
  • The study suggests this framing may miss the localised harm it causes during precisely the season when dispersion is weakest.
• Smaller Cities
  • Much of India's air quality monitoring and policy attention is concentrated on large metros.
  • The higher burning incidence in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities indicates that pollution management capacity needs to extend well beyond the major urban centres.

Way Forward

• Strengthening waste collection coverage, particularly in underserved and low-income neighbourhoods, addresses the root cause rather than the symptom.
• Enforcing segregation at source reduces the volume of mixed waste that is most likely to be burned and most toxic when it is.
• Expanding processing and disposal capacity so that collected waste has somewhere to go, preventing accumulation at transfer points.
• Targeted monitoring in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, where incidence is highest, but monitoring infrastructure is thinnest.
• Integrating waste burning into winter action plans, recognising localised exposure as a distinct concern from citywide emission averages.
• Supporting informal waste workers, who often handle collection in underserved areas and are among the most exposed to burning emissions.

Context:

• The debate over judicial appointments has been revived by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Arvind Malhotra v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh, concerning the elevation of a High Court judge to the Supreme Court.
• The case raised concerns over whether judicial appointments should remain confidential, particularly when questions of merit, seniority and perceived political proximity arise.
• The central issue is a larger constitutional question: Can judicial independence and institutional integrity be strengthened through a more transparent and representative appointment process?

India’s Collegium System - Confidentiality vs Transparency:

• In Arvind Malhotra, the applicant, an experienced Himachal Pradesh High Court judge, challenged the elevation of a junior judge over him, alleging that the latter was perceived as supportive of the government of the day.
• The Supreme Court did not accept the challenge. It noted that the High Court Collegium had recommended the appointment and the Supreme Court Collegium had subsequently approved it.
• The Court also emphasised that confidentiality is necessary to preserve the integrity of judicial appointments.
• This raises an important dilemma. While confidentiality may protect candidates and prevent undue external pressure, excessive secrecy can also generate doubts about the objectivity, accountability and legitimacy of appointments.

The South African Alternative:

• South Africa offers a contrasting model. Judicial appointments are handled through the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), a constitutional body comprising senior judges, lawyers, legal academics and limited political representation.
• Unlike India's largely confidential collegium deliberations, the South African process is substantially open -
  • Vacancies are publicly advertised and nominations invited.
  • A shortlist is prepared and public comments are sought.
  • Candidates undergo public interviews to assess their suitability.
  • Where consensus is absent, members may vote.
  • The identities of individual voters and their choices remain confidential.
• The system therefore combines institutional participation with public scrutiny, while retaining limited confidentiality where necessary.

Transparency as a Safeguard for Integrity:

• The comparison raises the fundamental question of whether judicial appointments should be conducted behind closed doors or through an open process.
• Transparency can enhance -
  • Public confidence in the judiciary;
  • Professional credibility of appointments;
  • Accountability of the appointing authority;
  • Perception of merit, impartiality and independence.
• For an institution exercising enormous public power, legitimacy depends not only on actual independence but also on public perception of independence.

Scrutiny of Judicial Conduct:

• South Africa also provides for greater openness in disciplinary proceedings against judges.
• Allegations of improper conduct can trigger investigation by the JSC and, where appropriate, a public inquiry.
• The example of a senior High Court judge facing a public inquiry following a sexual-harassment complaint illustrates the principle that the judicial office does not place judges beyond institutional scrutiny.
• A finding of gross misconduct can ultimately lead to a recommendation for impeachment.
• Such mechanisms seek to balance judicial independence with judicial accountability.

Who Should Appoint Judges?

• The comparison also raises a deeper institutional question: should judges be appointed primarily through a collegium of judges, or through a more representative constitutional body?
• Since judges exercise a public constitutional function, the appointment mechanism must command broad societal confidence.
• At the same time, political participation must not become political control, as that could compromise judicial independence.
• The challenge is therefore to design a mechanism that reconciles independence, accountability, merit, diversity and transparency.

Way Forward:

• Reforms cannot emerge from silence. Lawyers, judges, politicians and legal academics must engage in an open and fearless constitutional debate on judicial appointments and disciplinary mechanisms.
• India need not mechanically replicate the South African model. However, greater transparency—while protecting genuinely sensitive information—could strengthen confidence in the judiciary.

Conclusion:

• Judicial independence does not necessarily require institutional secrecy. Indeed, carefully designed transparency can reinforce independence by making the appointment process more credible and publicly legitimate.
• A democratic judiciary must therefore balance confidentiality with accountability and ensure that judicial elevation is based on competence, integrity and independence rather than perceived political alignment.
• The ultimate objective should be a judicial appointment system that is not merely independent, but is seen to be independent by citizens.

Context

• India is facing a growing public-health crisis involving childhood obesity, diabetes and hypertension.
• Changing lifestyles contribute to this problem, but the increasing availability, affordability and aggressive marketing of foods high in fat, salt and sugar (HFSS) are equally important.
• Children are particularly vulnerable because their food choices are influenced by advertising, school environments, pricing and parental perceptions.
• The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed bold red front-of-pack warning labels for unhealthy packaged foods.
• This is a welcome step, but labelling alone cannot address the wider food environment.

Rising Burden of Childhood Obesity and Diabetes

• The World Obesity Atlas 2026 estimates that around 41 million Indian children and adolescents aged 5–19 are overweight or obese.
• The rise in childhood obesity and diabetes demonstrates that unhealthy diets have become a structural health concern rather than merely an issue of individual choice.
• Breakfast cereals, sweetened yoghurt and health drinks are often promoted as nutritious sources of energy and vitamins while their high sugar content receives inadequate attention.
• Such marketing creates an information imbalance, making products appear healthier than they actually are.
• The addition of sugar to infant food sold in India and other lower-income markets, while comparable European products reportedly contained no added sugar, also raises concerns about unequal food standards across markets.
• Public pressure has similarly been required in some cases to encourage manufacturers to reduce excessive sugar.

Front-of-Pack Warning Labels: A Necessary Beginning

• A prominent red warning label can make nutritional risks immediately visible at the point of purchase.
• Unlike information hidden in fine print, front-of-pack warnings can help consumers identify products containing excessive sugar, salt or fat.
• However, awareness does not automatically change behaviour. Consumers may continue purchasing unhealthy products because they are cheap, convenient and heavily marketed.
• Labelling must therefore be part of a comprehensive regulatory framework.

The Enforcement Gap in Schools

• Schools and colleges provide an important opportunity to influence children's dietary habits.
• Existing recommendations concerning unhealthy food sales have limited impact when compliance remains voluntary.
• School canteens frequently sell inexpensive products that are commercially popular.
• An energy drink costing ₹20 and containing substantial sugar and caffeine illustrates how unhealthy products are priced within children's purchasing capacity.
• Restrictions should therefore be mandatory, supported by inspections and penalties.
• Regulation should also cover vendors operating immediately outside educational institutions.

The Unorganised Food Sector: The Missing Half

• Packaged-food regulation has limited reach because a large share of Indians' consumption occurs through street vendors, dhabas, sweet shops and other unorganised businesses.
• A warning label on packaged food cannot address the nutritional risks of loose jalebi, samosas or sugary drinks.
• India consequently needs a phased regulatory framework for the unorganised sector, combining nutritional standards, vendor training, public awareness and practical enforcement.

The Way Forward

• Sugar Tax as an Economic Instrument
  • The United Kingdom's experience demonstrates that taxation can encourage manufacturers to reformulate products and reduce sugar.
  • India's taxation structure provides limited incentives for such reformulation when sugary and sugar-free beverages receive similar treatment.
  • A tiered sugar tax could encourage companies to lower sugar content to reduce their tax liability.
  • Such taxation would therefore influence both consumer demand and industry behaviour.
• Protecting the Poor Through Better Policy Design
  • The concern that a sugar tax could disproportionately affect poorer households is legitimate. However, low-income families already bear a disproportionate burden of diabetes, hypertension and obesity-related healthcare costs.
  • Doing nothing is not cost-free; it shifts the burden from consumers at the point of purchase to families and the healthcare system.
  • A better approach would be to calibrate taxation to sugar content, use part of the revenue to subsidise healthier foods and strengthen nutrition programmes.
• Towards a Comprehensive Food Policy
  • India needs an integrated food-policy framework based on:
    • Mandatory front-of-pack warning labels for HFSS foods.
    • Nutritional standards for school and college canteens.
    • Restrictions on advertising unhealthy foods to children.
    • Regulation of food sales around educational institutions.
    • Gradual regulation of the unorganised food sector.
    • Sugar-content-based taxation encouraging reformulation.
    • Affordable access to healthier foods through targeted subsidies.
    • Stronger inspections and penalties.
    • Nutrition education for parents, children and teachers.
    • Uniform and transparent food standards across markets.

Conclusion

• India's obesity and diabetes crisis requires a shift from viewing unhealthy eating solely as an individual responsibility to recognising it as a structural public-health challenge.
• Consumers cannot make informed choices when nutritional risks are obscured and unhealthy products are aggressively marketed and widely available.
• The FSSAI's proposed warning label is an important beginning, but its effectiveness will depend on stronger enforcement and complementary policies.
• The ultimate objective should be to create a food environment where healthy choices are visible, affordable and accessible.
• India's response must therefore move beyond informing consumers towards reshaping the incentives and environments that influence what people eat.

About Bhoramdev Wildlife Sanctuary:

• Bhoramdev Wildlife Sanctuary is located in Chhattisgarh.
• It is part of the larger Maikal range of the Satpura hills.
• It is part of the Kanha-Achanakmar Corridor, which connects Kanha National Park in Madhya Pradesh with Achanakmar Wildlife Sanctuary in Chhattisgarh.
• It is named after the famous Bhoramdeo Temple.
  • Bhoramdeo Temple, an ancient temple complex dating back to the 7th to 11th centuries, was built by the Nagvanshi dynasty.
  • The temple is dedicated to Lord Shiva and is often referred to as the “Khajuraho of Chhattisgarh.”
• The sanctuary’s terrain is characterized by undulating hills, dense forests, and numerous streams.
• The region surrounding Bhoramdev Wildlife Sanctuary is inhabited by various tribal communities, including the Baiga, Gond, and Kanwar
• Rivers: The river Sakari flows through the sanctuary and is the source of drinking water for the wild animals.
• Flora: It contains tropical moist and dry deciduous woodland with trees such as saaj, sal, tendu, and eucalyptus.
• Fauna: Its habitats support Bengal tiger, leopard, sloth bear, sambar, gaur, wild boar, monitor lizard, and many bird species.

About Saqqara:

• It is part of the necropolis of the ancient Egyptian city of Memphis.
• In 1979 the ancient ruins of the Memphis area, including Ṣaqqārah, Abū Ṣīr, Dahshūr, Abū Ruwaysh, and the Pyramids of Giza, were collectively designated a UNESCO World Heritage site.
• Saqqara contains numerous pyramids, tombs, mastabas, temples, and other funerary monuments.
• A mastaba is an ancient Egyptian rectangular tomb structure with a flat roof and sloping sides.
• Saqqara is where the transition from the use of the mastaba as a burial site to the pyramid design that is more popularly known today took place.
• Kings and noblemen from the very first two dynasties (c.3040–2686 BC) were buried here, and this is also the location of the Step Pyramid of Djoser (c.2686–2667 BC).
  • It is the oldest surviving pyramid in the world.
  • Designed by the architect Imhotep, its distinctive six-tiered form marked a crucial stage in the development of pyramid construction and paved the way for the great pyramids that followed.
• The pyramids of some of the most important kings of the Old Kingdom Fifth (c.2494–2345 BC) and Sixth (c.2345–2181 BC) Dynasties are located in Saqqara.
• One of these, the pyramid of Unas (also known as Wenis; (c.2375–2345 BC), features the oldest pyramid burial chamber decorated with texts.
• Among the most important of Saqqara’s monuments is the Serapeum, a series of underground galleries in which the Apis Bulls were buried from the Eighteenth Dynasty (c.1550–1295 BC) to the Ptolemaic Period (332–30 BC).
  • The Apis Bull was considered an incarnation of Ptah himself, one of the most important gods of Memphis.