Context:

• The article critically examines the Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission Gramin (VB-G RAM G), which replaced the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).
• Despite government claims of expanded employment guarantees and higher allocations, early implementation data indicates a sharp decline in rural employment generation.
• This has raised concerns over livelihood security, cooperative federalism and workers' rights.

Government Claims vs Ground Reality:

• The Centre has projected VB-G RAM G as an upgraded version of MGNREGA with -
  • 125 days of guaranteed employment (up from 100 days).
  • Universal rural coverage.
  • Record budgetary allocation by the Centre.
  • Additional 40% financial contribution by States.
  • Greater efficiency through digital monitoring.
• However, official data presents a contrasting picture -
  • Nearly 50% year-on-year decline in rural employment generated during the first month of implementation (July 2026).
  • Employment generation between January–June 2026 declined from about 335.4 million person-days (2025) to 215.2 million person-days, a fall of 35.8%.
  • The number of households demanding work reportedly declined by nearly 50%, despite persistent rural distress, unemployment and drought conditions.

Major Criticisms of VB-G RAM G:

• The "125-day employment" myth: Although the law promises 125 days of guaranteed employment,
  • Workers are often denied work despite demand.
  • The legal responsibility to guarantee employment has effectively shifted to State governments.
  • The Centre has not committed sufficient financial resources beyond its own "normative allocation," making the guarantee difficult to implement.
• Inadequate financial allocation:
  • ₹95,000 crore of Central allocation, and an additional 40% contribution by States, taking the total notional outlay to about ₹1.55 lakh crore.
  • However,
    • Budgetary allocation is meaningful only if work is actually provided.
    • Complex cost-sharing discourages States from expanding employment.
    • The funding model risks shifting responsibility for poor implementation from the Centre to States.
• Higher wage claims: The law prescribes a floor wage of ₹300 per day. However, critics argue that -
• The wage remains below statutory minimum wages in many States.
• It is significantly lower than the Satpathy Committee recommendation of ₹375 per day (2018 prices) for a national minimum wage.
• Consequently, wage enhancement may not adequately address rural livelihood concerns.
• Digital governance and worker exclusion:
  • VB-G RAM G relies heavily on digital monitoring through e-KYC verification, facial recognition system, National Mobile Monitoring System (NMMS), and geo-tagged attendance.
  • However,
    • Large-scale deletion of job cards following e-KYC requirements has excluded many genuine workers.
    • Facial recognition and app-based attendance create operational difficulties, especially in remote rural areas.
    • Digital compliance has become a barrier to accessing employment rather than improving service delivery.
• Concerns over cooperative federalism: The law mandates 40% State funding, however,
  • States were not adequately consulted before introducing the new funding model.
  • The arrangement allegedly conflicts with Article 258 of the Constitution (Allocation of administrative functions between the Union and States).
  • It envisages Central financial support where States implement Central laws imposing additional responsibilities.
  • The new model may weaken the fiscal autonomy of States instead of promoting genuine cooperative federalism. 

Concerns:

• Legislative and democratic:
  • VB-G RAM G was enacted without meaningful consultation with workers' organisations, State governments, Parliamentary Standing Committees, and Opposition parties.
  • Parliamentary scrutiny was limited despite widespread objections from labour unions and civil society groups.
• Socio-economic: The weakening of the employment guarantee framework may -
  • Reduce livelihood security for rural households.
  • Increase vulnerability during agricultural distress and drought.
  • Disproportionately affect women workers, who constitute a significant share of rural employment guarantee beneficiaries.
  • Worsen rural unemployment at a time of growing economic uncertainty.
• Constitutional and governance issues:
  • Imposing additional financial obligations on States without adequate compensation raises constitutional concerns (Article 258).
  • Governance issues: Fiscal federalism, social security and right to livelihood, digital inclusion versus digital exclusion, accountability in welfare delivery, and evidence-based public policy.

Critical Analysis:

• The new legislation weakens rather than strengthens India's rural employment guarantee system.
• While concerns deserve careful examination, a balanced assessment would also require evaluating the government's stated objectives (over a longer implementation period) of -
  • Improving efficiency,
  • Reducing leakages and
  • Expanding employment opportunities.
• Since the programme is relatively new, its long-term outcomes will depend on adequate funding, effective Centre-State coordination, and timely correction of implementation bottlenecks.

Conclusion:

• India's rural employment guarantee remains a crucial social protection mechanism for millions of vulnerable households.
• To achieve the objectives of inclusive growth and Viksit Bharat, employment guarantee reforms must strengthen—not dilute—access to work by facilitating rather than excluding beneficiaries.