Conclusion

• The wars in Ukraine and Iran have exposed a fundamental limitation of modern air power: control of the skies does not automatically ensure victory.
• Ukraine’s networked air defence prevented Russia from securing uncontested airspace, while allied air dominance over Iran failed to compel Tehran to end the conflict.
• Air power remains indispensable, but it cannot win a war independently.
• For India, this raises important questions about the Indian Air Force’s preference for operational flexibility over fixed theatre commands.
• While this approach has worked against Pakistan, its effectiveness against China remains untested.

Air Power’s Limits Exposed

• Denial of Airspace
  • The Ukraine conflict shows that aircraft numbers alone cannot guarantee air superiority. Integrated air-defence networks can deny access even to a larger air force.
  • For India, this creates a two-sided challenge: strong air defence could deny China control of Indian skies, while inadequate integration could expose India to similar vulnerabilities.
• Air Dominance Does Not Guarantee Victory
  • The allied campaign against Iran demonstrated that air dominance does not necessarily produce strategic victory.
  • Even when opposing forces can strike everything they detect, concealed and dispersed capabilities may survive.
  • This matters for India because Pakistan and China represent very different strategic challenges.
  • Pakistan has limited strategic depth and can be pressured relatively quickly, whereas China has greater military capacity, geographical depth and endurance.
• The Changing Cost Arithmetic
  • The growing use of inexpensive drones creates an unfavourable cost-exchange ratio for defenders.
  • Shahed-type drones can cost tens of thousands of dollars, while interceptors may cost millions.
  • India encountered a similar challenge during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when cheaper drones required costlier defensive responses.
  • Against China, such economic asymmetry could become much larger.
  • Modern air warfare therefore increasingly requires cost-effective air defence, drones, electronic warfare and layered capabilities, rather than dependence on expensive interceptors alone.

The IAF’s Case Against Theatre-isation

• Flexibility Versus the China Challenge
  • The success of Balakot and Operation Sindoor strengthens the IAF's argument that centralised flexibility can deliver results.
  • However, the China front presents a fundamentally different environment.
  • India faces constraints in aircraft availability, while Himalayan geography, limited airbases and difficult terrain restrict rapid redeployment.
  • An approach successful against Pakistan may therefore prove inadequate against China.
• The Jointness Deficit
  • If flexibility cannot overcome these constraints, stronger tri-service jointness becomes essential.
  • Joint-force generation, common planning, intelligence-sharing and integrated training can improve effectiveness without requiring immediate large-scale hardware expansion.
  • The Kargil conflict of 1999 exposed shortcomings in inter-service coordination, while the Ladakh crisis of 2020 demonstrated that the problem remained unresolved.
• Institutional and Career Barriers
  • Resistance to integration is not purely doctrinal. Career progression, service hierarchies and differences in rank structures can influence attitudes towards joint commands.
  • India needs to make joint experience an integral part of military careers so that officers do not perceive joint postings as a professional disadvantage.
  • The United States provides an example of institutionalising joint experience within career progression.
• Consultative Authority Versus Command Authority
  • The IAF’s proposed Joint Coordination Centre emphasises consultation and coordination.
  • Such arrangements may work in peacetime, but wartime conditions require rapid decisions and clearly defined authority.
  • A theatre command provides a single commander with operational responsibility over a geographical area.
  • The United States, China and Israel have adopted stronger forms of joint command, demonstrating the importance of decisive authority during crises.

The Cost of Delay

• The IAF's position is defensible because its flexibility has produced results against Pakistan.
• The unresolved question is whether the same model can deliver rapid mobilisation, efficient resource allocation and effective joint operations against China.
• If tensions simultaneously escalate in Ladakh and Siachen, India may have to allocate limited Rafale aircraft and S-400 systems between multiple fronts.
• Such decisions cannot depend on lengthy consultation during an active conflict.
• A prolonged jointness gap could leave commanders along the Line of Actual Control uncertain about the timely availability of air support.
• In war, such delays could directly affect India's ability to protect its territory.

Conclusion

• Theatre-isation should not be viewed simply as a dispute between the IAF and advocates of integrated commands because the larger question is India’s preparedness for a conflict with China.
• Modern warfare requires air power to function alongside air defence, drones, missiles, intelligence, electronic warfare, logistics and joint command structures.
• The IAF's flexibility remains valuable, but China presents a different challenge in scale, geography and endurance.
• India must therefore resolve its organisational questions before a crisis forces decisions under battlefield conditions.
• The responsibility ultimately belongs to the political leadership, which must ensure that India’s armed forces are prepared before the next war tests them.