Context:

• India’s Parliament and State Legislatures were designed to be the primary forums for representation, deliberation, law-making and executive accountability.
• However, these institutions have progressively weakened because of fewer sittings, disruptions, declining legislative scrutiny, weak committee participation and inadequate parliamentary accountability.
• The concern is not merely about the number of sitting days; it is about the erosion of the quality and effectiveness of representative democracy.

From Vibrant Legislatures to Fewer Sittings:

• In the early decades after Independence, Parliament met for around 100 days or more annually.
• The two Houses averaged 127 sitting days in the 1950s, rising to 138 in the 1960s. Since the 1990s, however, the trend has reversed.
• The 17th Lok Sabha (2019–2024) averaged only 55 sitting days a year, the lowest among full-term Lok Sabhas. According to PRS, it held 274 sittings over five years.
• This decline reduces opportunities for Question Hour, Call Attention, debates on Demands for Grants, legislative scrutiny, discussion of public grievances, and executive accountability.
• Parliamentary democracy is not limited to periodic elections; accountability must also operate continuously between elections through legislative oversight.

Disruptions and the Erosion of Accountability:

• Frequent slogan-shouting, protests, placards and adjournments consume legislative time. Consequently, ministers face fewer opportunities for sustained questioning and scrutiny.
• Disruptions have transformed Parliament from a forum of deliberation into a space where political confrontation often overrides legislative business.
• However, the problem is broader than disruptions alone. PRS data show that during the 17th Lok Sabha, 35% of Bills were passed with less than one hour of discussion in Lok Sabha, while only 16% of Bills were referred to parliamentary committees.

State Legislatures - Constitutional Minimum Becoming the Norm:

• The decline is equally visible in State Assemblies. Their average annual sittings have fallen from around 80 days or more in the 1950s–60s to about 25 days today.
• For example,
  • UP: Around 45–50 days in the 1970s to roughly 15–20 days in recent years.
  • Karnataka: From more than 70 days in the 1970s to around 25–33 days.
  • Kerala: From about 83 days in the 1950s to around 43.
  • Punjab and Haryana: Now around 10–15 days annually.
  • Bihar: From 60–70 days to around 30.
• Article 174(1) provides that the Governor must summon the State Legislature so that not more than six months intervene between two sessions.
• This constitutional requirement can become a mere procedural minimum rather than a guarantee of meaningful legislative functioning.

Weakening of Parliamentary Committees:

• Parliamentary committees are essential for detailed, non-partisan and specialised scrutiny of legislation, government expenditure and public policy.
• The Departmentally Related Standing Committee system, introduced in 1993, was intended to enable MPs to develop policy expertise and examine government functioning in greater depth.
• However, there is low attendance in committee meetings, weak enforcement of attendance by political parties, insufficient priority given to parliamentary responsibilities, and declining referral of Bills to committees.
• PRS data show that only 16% of Bills in the 17th Lok Sabha were referred to committees. At the same time, committees still held around 1,700 meetings, showing their continuing institutional importance.

Hasty Law-Making:

• Effective law-making requires the stages of debate, for example, committee scrutiny → stakeholder consultation → amendment → legislative approval, rather than merely numerical passage of Bills.
• There were instances where important legislation was passed within minutes and sometimes without adequate debate.
• Such practices raise concerns regarding quality of legislation, parliamentary deliberation, stakeholder consultation, constitutional scrutiny, and legislative accountability.
• The concern is particularly significant when legislation affects fundamental rights, public expenditure or major sectors of the economy.

Financial Cost and Public Accountability:

• With the declining number of working days, the cost of running Parliament is also rising.
• It argues that public expenditure on legislators and parliamentary functioning must be accompanied by greater institutional performance and accountability.
• It also questions the continuation of certain privileges and perquisites when legislative responsibilities are not being adequately discharged.
• The larger issue is therefore not simply the salaries of MPs and MLAs but the principle of public accountability for public expenditure.

Institutional Reform:

• There is the need for stronger accountability and legislatures should function for a substantially greater number of days.
• Possible reforms include:
  • Establishing a minimum number of annual sitting days.
  • Strengthening Question Hour and legislative debates.
  • Mandatory or stronger norms for committee attendance.
  • Increasing referral of important Bills to Departmentally Related Standing Committees.
  • Greater scrutiny of Demands for Grants and public expenditure.
  • Developing a parliamentary code of conduct against persistent disruptions.
  • Strengthening the autonomy and authority of presiding officers.
  • Encouraging MPs/MLAs to develop greater policy and legislative expertise.
  • Greater public disclosure of legislative performance.

Conclusion:

• The central message is that the health of Indian democracy depends not merely on conducting elections but on ensuring effective functioning of legislatures between elections.
• Fewer sittings, disruptions, inadequate scrutiny and rushed legislation weaken Parliament and State Assemblies as institutions of representation and accountability.
• Restoring their effectiveness requires better deliberation and greater accountability of both the government and legislators.