Why in news?

The Yemen-based Houthi militia announced recently that it will target Saudi Arabian tankers crossing the Bab al-Mandab strait. It has already attacked several ships — widening the West Asia conflict's impact on India's crude oil imports beyond the earlier Strait of Hormuz crisis.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The New Chokepoint Threat
• Immediate Consequences of a Houthi Blockade
• India's First Fallback: Russian Crude
• Scale of India's Russian Oil Dependence
• Other Supply Buffers
• Pricing Pressure on Russian Oil
• The Bigger Risk: Russia's Black Sea Exports
• Medium-Term Risk: Russian Refinery Recovery

The New Chokepoint Threat

• The Bab al-Mandab connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea — a critical global trade and energy chokepoint, alongside the Strait of Hormuz.
• Impact already visible: Vessel crossings through Bab al-Mandab fell to an average of 31 per day over the past three days, down from 43 per day in the first half of July (S&P Global data).
• Saudi Arabia had been using this route — independent of the Strait of Hormuz — to export oil, including to India, as Hormuz traffic dwindled to a trickle.

Immediate Consequences of a Houthi Blockade

• Oil shipments to Asia would face delays, as tankers reroute westward through the Suez Canal and around Africa.
• This could add up to four weeks to the journey and raise costs due to higher freight and insurance premiums.
• The blockade could keep oil prices elevated — a significant concern since India depends on imports for over 88% of its oil needs.
• Despite these risks, industry experts describe the situation as "a matter of concern" but manageable.

India's First Fallback: Russian Crude

• Russian oil has so far remained safe from Houthi attacks, as in earlier Bab al-Mandab blockades by the Iran-backed militia.
• The Suez Canal-Red Sea route is the primary corridor for Russian oil reaching Indian ports.
• If Russian oil supply via this route remains unaffected while the blockade targets only Saudi Arabia, the impact should be limited — expecting Russian crude movement to increase and compensate for Saudi volume losses.
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Scale of India's Russian Oil Dependence

• Russian crude imports rose sharply from around 1 million bpd in February to record highs of 2.6 million bpd in June — over 50% of India's total oil imports.
• July imports are tracking at similar levels.
• Before the war, over 40% of India's oil imports came from West Asia via the Strait of Hormuz.
• As per the analysts, Russian crude imports could potentially rise toward or above 3 million bpd if market conditions and Russian export availability permit.

Other Supply Buffers

• Saudi Arabia's East-West (Yanbu) pipeline currently supplies roughly 300,000–500,000 bpd, offering a buffer if Red Sea transit stays open.
• UAE's Murban crude can bypass both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, loading from Fujairah and reaching India in 5–6 days — a practical emergency option.
• American and South American oil remain theoretical alternatives, but long voyage times make them unsuitable as emergency replacement barrels.
• India's increasingly diversified crude slate, spanning dozens of global suppliers, provides greater flexibility than in previous years, reducing severe disruption risk.

Pricing Pressure on Russian Oil

• Russian Urals crude was earlier offered at around a $7/barrel discount to Dubai crude before the latest escalation.
• These discounts have disappeared, with Russian barrels now trading at premiums as Indian refiners compete for supply.
• India's incremental access to Urals is limited, as China and Turkey compete for the same barrels.

The Bigger Risk: Russia's Black Sea Exports

• Experts flag that Russian Black Sea export infrastructure — particularly the Novorossiysk terminal — may pose a greater risk to India than the Red Sea disruption itself:
  • Unlike Red Sea cargoes (reroutable via Africa), Black Sea export alternatives are limited.
  • The Sheskharis terminal at Novorossiysk halted operations last week following Ukrainian strikes.
  • This terminal is critical for India: of 1.1 million bpd loaded there in June, ~840,000 bpd went to India — the Novorossiysk complex supplied about 28% of India's Russian crude imports that month.
  • Satellite tracking suggests loadings paused from June 20, though some tankers are reportedly switching off transponders to avoid attacks; the port infrastructure itself appears undamaged, and the disruption is expected to be temporary.

Medium-Term Risk: Russian Refinery Recovery

• Russia recently increased crude exports as Ukrainian strikes forced several refineries offline for repairs, freeing additional barrels for export (mainly to China and India).
• Russia exported a record 4.5 million bpd of crude in June, of which about 55% went to India.
• As affected refineries resume operations, Moscow is expected to prioritise domestic fuel needs over exports — Russian crude exports could fall by as much as 1 million bpd once refineries fully recover.

Conclusion

India's oil security faces a layered risk — a Houthi blockade at Bab al-Mandab threatens Saudi supplies, but experts suggest Russian Black Sea export infrastructure, particularly around Novorossiysk, now poses an equally or more significant medium-term risk given Russia's dominant 50%+ share of India's crude imports.

A diversified supplier base and flexible sourcing from the UAE and elsewhere give India some cushion, but sustained disruption on either front would test that resilience.