Why in news?

The Centre took two significant steps in the seven-year-old Union Territory of Ladakh recently: a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) sub-committee shared a 32-page draft proposal with civil society leaders, while the Lieutenant Governor’s administration announced Sankoo as Ladakh’s eighth district.

Though seemingly unrelated, both moves reflect the Centre’s evolving approach to Ladakh’s persistent demands for Statehood and inclusion in the Sixth Schedule — demands that have fuelled recurring street protests since Ladakh was carved out as a UT from Jammu & Kashmir in 2019.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Why the Draft Proposal Was Rejected?
• Background: The High-Powered Committee (HPC)
• The May 2026 Commitment — And Why the New Draft Fell Short
• New Districts: A Parallel Governance Push

Why the Draft Proposal Was Rejected?

• The Leh Apex Body (LAB) and Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) jointly rejected the draft in principle.
• Key grievances:
  • The draft marked a significant departure from assurances made during earlier sub-committee meetings.
  • It failed to address the demand for a legislative assembly.
  • It offered no constitutional safeguards under Article 371 tailored to Ladakh’s unique circumstances.
• LAB and KDA urged the MHA to instead accept their own draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), submitted recently in Leh.
• Notably, not all civil society groups agree: The Civil Society Forum of Ladakh, led by ex-MP Thupstan Chhewang, welcomed the MHA’s roadmap — exposing growing internal friction among Ladakh’s civil society organisations.

Background: The High-Powered Committee (HPC)

• Amid rising protests, the MHA constituted a High-Powered Committee (HPC) in 2023, chaired by MoS Home Affairs Nityanand Rai.
• HPC’s Mandate:
  • Protect Ladakh’s unique culture and language, factoring in its strategic location.
  • Safeguard land and employment for locals.
  • Promote inclusive development.
  • Empower the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDCs) of Leh and Kargil.
  • Recommend constitutional safeguards to secure the above.

The May 2026 Commitment — And Why the New Draft Fell Short

• Centre-Ladakh talks in May 2026 produced minutes stating:
  • Statehood would remain the long-term aspiration.
  • As a first step, a “customised model of governance” via a UT-level elected body with executive, financial, and legislative powers would be established.
  • A “sui generis” (unique) model under Article 371 was proposed.
  • A key agreement: the elected body would gain control and supervision over civil servants, with Transaction of Business Rules to define power-sharing between the elected body and the Lieutenant Governor.
• LAB and KDA’s complaint: The new draft instead resembles a North-East Frontier Agency-type arrangement — closer to a Territorial Council model with power concentrated in the LG’s administration, falling far short of the legislature-backed sui generis model promised in May.

New Districts: A Parallel Governance Push

• Since 1947, Ladakh (population ~3.5 lakh, spread over 59,146 sq km of challenging cold-desert terrain) had only two districts: Leh (Buddhist-majority) and Kargil (Shia Muslim-majority).
• 2026 Reform: Creation of six new districts — Sankoo, Sham, Nubra, Changthang, Zanskar, and Drass — aimed at bringing administration closer to people.
• Each new district will get a hill council, with locals electing 26 members per council — intended to boost local representation.
• Existing hill councils: LAHDC-Leh (1995) and LAHDC-Kargil (2003) historically set local priorities and budgets, but their influence declined after 2019 under direct Central rule.
• The Ladakh administration is also pushing a three-tier representation system — elections for panchayats, municipalities, and hill councils — to strengthen participatory governance in a UT that still lacks a legislature.

Conclusion

The Centre’s twin moves — a contested governance draft and the creation of new districts — reveal a dual-track strategy for Ladakh: offering administrative decentralisation through more districts and hill councils, while sidestepping the core political demand for a full legislature and constitutional safeguards.

For Ladakh’s civil society, this distinction matters deeply — administrative proximity is not the same as political empowerment.

Until the gap between the Centre’s May 2026 promises and its October draft is bridged, Ladakh’s demand for Statehood and Sixth Schedule protection is likely to remain a live political fault line, even as governance on the ground gradually decentralises.