Context:
- The latest Sample Registration System (SRS) and the sixth round of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6) provide fresh insights into India's demographic transition.
- The data indicate that while India is steadily moving towards population stabilisation, significant challenges remain, particularly in terms of -
- Regional demographic disparities,
- Declining fertility,
- Skewed sex ratio at birth, and
- The policy implications of differential population growth.
India’s Population Outlook:
- Total Fertility Rate (TFR): Average number of children expected to be born to a woman during her reproductive years. A replacement-level fertility of 2.1 ensures long-term population stability.
- The University of Washington (2017) projected India's Total Fertility Rate (TFR) at 1.9 and estimated the population would peak at 160 crore by 2048.
- However, the latest SRS (2024) records the TFR at 1.9 now, indicating a slower fertility decline than previously expected.
- The UN Population Division projects India's population to peak at around 170 crore by 2062 before gradually declining. Based on current data, this appears to be the most realistic projection.
Persistent Demographic Concerns:
- Skewed sex ratio at birth (SRB):
- The SRB (2022–24) stands at 918 girls per 1,000 boys, far below the biological norm of 955.
- Although it has improved from 907 (2018–20), progress remains slow.
- At the present pace, achieving the natural sex ratio may take over a decade, prolonging the "girl deficit" and its associated social consequences.
- Demographic divergence across States:
- India's demographic transition is highly uneven. For example, TFR in Bihar is 2.9, Uttar Pradesh (2.6), while at all India level it is 1.9.
- At the current pace, Bihar may take 18 years and Uttar Pradesh around 10 years to attain replacement fertility.
- This widening demographic gap has implications for economic development, resource allocation and political representation.
Drivers of High Fertility in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh:
- Women's empowerment:
- Educational attainment remains substantially lower than the national average. For instance,
- Women ever attending school in India stands at 73.7%, Bihar (64.1%), and Uttar Pradesh (70.1%).
- Women with 10 or more years of schooling in India (46.4%), Bihar (33.1%), and Uttar Pradesh (42.5%).
- Greater female education delays marriage, enhances workforce participation and reduces fertility.
- Contraceptive use:
- Use of contraception among married women (15–49 years) - India (69.1%), Bihar (59.3%), and Uttar Pradesh (62.4%).
- The data highlight the need to strengthen family welfare programmes, improve reproductive healthcare and expand women's access to contraception.
Should Low-Fertility States Encourage Higher Birth Rates?
- States such as Andhra Pradesh have introduced pronatalist policies, including:
- One-time incentive of ₹30,000 for the third child and ₹40,000 for the fourth child.
- Monthly nutrition allowance of ₹1,000 for the third child.
- Free education up to 18 years.
- Extended maternity leave.
- However, demographic research—including Alva Myrdal's work Nation and Family—suggests that one-time financial incentives rarely produce sustained increases in fertility.
Political Dimension - Delimitation and Demographic Performance:
- The concern over declining fertility is driven less by labour shortages and more by fears of reduced political representation after future delimitation.
- States with successful population control fear losing parliamentary seats relative to faster-growing states.
- Hence, the political concerns should not be addressed through population policy.
- A useful precedent exists in Finance Commission tax devolution, where both the population and demographic performance are considered while allocating states' shares.
- A similar balanced approach could prevent states from being penalised for achieving demographic success.
Way Forward:
- Accelerate: Women's education, empowerment and reproductive health services in high-fertility states.
- Expand: Access to modern contraception and strengthen family welfare programmes.
- Avoid: Policies aimed solely at increasing fertility in low-fertility states, as India remains far from overall population decline.
- Ensure: That political representation is not determined solely by population growth, thereby removing incentives for pronatalist policies.
- Focus: Equally on population quality—health, education, nutrition and human capital—alongside population quantity.
- Await: The next Census to reconcile differences between SRS and NFHS fertility estimates and enable evidence-based policymaking.
Conclusion:
- India's demographic transition is progressing steadily but unevenly.
- The immediate policy priority is not to increase fertility in low-fertility states, but to reduce regional disparities, while ensuring that demographic success does not translate into political disadvantage.
- A balanced approach focusing on population stabilisation and human capital development will be critical for India's long-term demographic dividend.