Why in news?

Elon Musk’s reported throttling of the military-grade Starshield network to Ukraine — in retaliation for Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure — has renewed global scrutiny of dependence on foreign-controlled technology.

For India, which has thus far resisted Starlink’s entry, the episode is a cautionary signal: across satellite communications, navigation, cloud computing, digital payments, and military equipment, India retains significant exposure to foreign-controlled systems, even where providers have acted lawfully so far.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Spectrum of Risk
• Satellite Communications
• Satellite Navigation: India’s Weakest Link
• Cloud Computing and IT Infrastructure
• Digital Payments: A Partial Success Story
• Military Equipment Dependence
• Conclusion

The Spectrum of Risk

• Exposure to foreign technology can manifest in three ways:
  • A foreign operator directly restricting an ongoing service (worst case).
  • Foreign-controlled platforms disrupting access to an otherwise Indian system.
  • A foreign supplier gradually degrading India’s ability to sustain critical capabilities.

Satellite Communications

• India has licensed three companies for satellite broadband: Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb (India), and Jio Satellite Communications — none had received security clearance as of October 2026.
• Ownership ≠ Control
  • Starlink is fully controlled by Musk’s SpaceX.
  • Eutelsat OneWeb is effectively controlled by European governments — France (29.65%), UK (10.89%), Bharti Space (17.88%); Bharti Airtel separately owns 26% of its Indian subsidiary.
  • Jio-SES joint venture (2022): Jio owns 51%, yet network control remains with SES (Luxembourg-based).
• Mitigating factor: India’s ordinary telecom/internet traffic runs mostly over terrestrial networks; ISRO has launched its own communications satellites since 1981, and India maintains dedicated military satellite capabilities. Foreign dependence is concentrated specifically in broadband services.

Satellite Navigation: India’s Weakest Link

• India’s NavIC constellation (its GPS equivalent) is underperforming: as admitted by Union Minister in Parliament (July 2026), only 3 satellites currently provide PNT (positioning, navigation, timing) signals — while at least 4 are needed for standalone positioning.
• The US discontinued deliberate GPS degradation in 2000, but retains the ability to deny PNT services militarily in specific regions.
• NavIC’s shortfall stems partly from ISRO’s persistent launch-rate difficulties.

Cloud Computing and IT Infrastructure

• AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud dominate India’s cloud ecosystem; Analysts forecast Indian cloud spending at $17.5 billion in 2026.
• The government runs its own cloud — MeghRaj, via the National Informatics Centre (NIC) — hosting 2,170 ministries/departments (Dec 2025), though these still rely on empanelled private providers, including foreign ones.
• AWS-Yotta Partnership (Feb 2026): Deploys AWS Outposts for MeghRaj 2.0, keeping data physically in India — but Outposts still require connection to an AWS regional control system, meaning foreign-controlled management persists.
• Cautionary Precedent: The 2024 CrowdStrike outage disrupted Windows systems globally, including Indian airlines, airports, and securities firms — showing disruption need not be retaliatory to be damaging.
• Push for Open-Source Alternatives: India’s 2015 e-governance policy favours open-source; C-DAC has developed the Linux-based “Bharat Operating System Solutions.”

Digital Payments: A Partial Success Story

• NPCI’s UPI gives India considerable independence from Visa/Mastercard.
• However, the consumer-facing layer remains foreign-influenced (e.g., Google Pay) — though if Google Pay exited, users could simply switch to alternatives like PhonePe (majority-owned by Walmart, but infrastructure control stays domestic, unlike the Jio-SES case).
• Residual Risk: Banks operate within international correspondent networks — as seen when the EU disconnected select Russian banks from SWIFT (2022). India could face similar disruption via foreign sanctions, even without violating Indian law.

Military Equipment Dependence

• Historical Precedent: After the 1998 Operation Shakti nuclear tests, US sanctions blocked delivery of 30 LHTEC T800 helicopter engines to HAL, forcing India to source replacements from a French manufacturer.
• As per SIPRI (March 2026), India was the world’s second-largest arms importer (2021–2025); Russia accounted for 40%, with growing purchases from France, Israel, and the US.
• Even the indigenous Tejas fighter depends on US-made GE Aerospace engines, with delivery delays already constraining production schedules.

Conclusion

India’s technology landscape reveals a crucial distinction between ownership and control — Indian companies may hold majority stakes in satellite, cloud, or payment ventures, yet the underlying network management, software updates, and strategic levers often remain with foreign entities.

Domestic systems like UPI and MeghRaj do cut exposure. But ownership isn’t control. Real strategic autonomy needs more. India must finish the NavIC constellation. It must speed up defence indigenisation. Relying on foreign goodwill and contracts isn’t enough.