Why in news?

The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered by Justices Sanjay Karol and N Kotiswar Singh, ruled that protection against domestic cruelty under criminal law — ordinarily available to married women under Section 498A of the erstwhile IPC — now extends to women in live-in relationships, provided the couple shares an "intent to marry."

Since the IPC has been replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the ruling will likely apply to the corresponding provision, Section 85 of the BNS.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Legal Position Until Now
• Background: The Case That Triggered the Ruling
• Beyond Void Marriages: A Purposive Interpretation
• Why the Domestic Violence Act Isn't Sufficient?

The Legal Position Until Now

• Section 498A, IPC penalises a husband or his relatives for subjecting a woman to cruelty.
• Since the provision explicitly uses the word "husband," its application was traditionally limited to legally valid marriages.
• Over the years, the Supreme Court had expanded this to cover men who induced a woman into a legally void or voidable marriage (e.g., by concealing a prior subsisting marriage) — holding that such men cannot escape prosecution by claiming they were never a "husband."

Background: The Case That Triggered the Ruling

• The accused man sought to quash a Section 498A case filed by his partner, arguing his marriage to her was invalid since he was already married to someone else.
• The Karnataka High Court rejected this, ruling that a man who induces a woman to believe she is lawfully married to him cannot evade criminal responsibility merely because no valid marriage existed in law.
• This led to his appeal before the Supreme Court.

Beyond Void Marriages: A Purposive Interpretation

• Rather than confining itself to the narrow issue of void marriages, the bench addressed the broader question: can a man in a live-in relationship be prosecuted under Section 498A?
• SC adopted a "purposive interpretation," holding that since the law's original objective was to deter domestic cruelty, it must adapt to changing social realities — observing that "cruelty, any which way, does not check at the door, whether the house it enters is that of a married woman or not."
• The Court held that denying criminal law protection to a cohabiting woman while granting it to a married woman has "no rational nexus with the object of preventing domestic violence" and is thus "offensive to Article 14" (Right to Equality) of the Constitution.

Why the Domestic Violence Act Isn't Sufficient?

• Both the petitioner and the Union government argued that unmarried women are already protected under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence (DV) Act, 2005, which covers relationships "in the nature of marriage."
• The Court rejected this, distinguishing the two laws:
  • The DV Act is primarily civil legislation, offering remedies like maintenance and protection orders.
  • Section 498A is a criminal provision, backed by the force of criminal deterrence.
• Equating the two would be a "misstatement of law" given their fundamentally different legal character and consequences.

Why "Intent to Marry" Is the Key Qualifier

• To determine which live-in couples qualify for this protection, the Court borrowed the concept of a "relationship in the nature of marriage" from the DV Act — a narrower subset of general live-in relationships.
• Drawing on a 2013 judgment, the Court reiterated the features of such a relationship: pooling financial resources, shared domestic arrangements, a sexual relationship, and holding themselves out to society as spouses.
• Crucially, the recent ruling added a new requirement: the couple must also possess an "intent to marry."
• Rationale
  • Many relationships may satisfy all criteria of being "in the nature of marriage," yet the partners may never intend to marry.
  • Without this intent, the relationship cannot be equated with marriage for invoking a penal provision with serious consequences.
  • The Court held: "Those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also have the requisite intent to marry are the closest to marriage itself" — and only these qualify for Section 498A protection.
• Burden of proof
  • The initial burden to establish "intent to marry" lies on the female partner seeking protection.
  • The judgment, however, did not specify concrete parameters for legally establishing this subjective intent.

Conclusion

By extending Section 498A's protection to live-in partners with a demonstrable "intent to marry," the Supreme Court has adopted a purposive, equality-driven interpretation of criminal law, recognising that cruelty is not contingent on formal marital status.

However, the absence of clear parameters for proving "intent to marry" leaves an evidentiary challenge that courts will have to navigate case by case.