Context:

• The announcement by the U.S. President Donald Trump about the possible resumption of nuclear testing has reignited global debate on the fragility of the post–Cold War nuclear restraint regime.
• This development compels India to reflect upon the sustainability of its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing in an evolving strategic and technological environment.

Global Nuclear Landscape - Erosion of the Moratorium:

• The end of the post–Cold war consensus:
  • For nearly three decades, a voluntary global moratorium on nuclear testing was held due to political convenience and moral persuasion rather than legal binding.
  • The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains unratified by key powers — the U.S., China, and Russia — keeping it in a state of limbo.
• Renewed testing activity and arms modernisation:
  • Russia has revived activities at its Arctic test sites.
  • China is expanding its facilities at Lop Nur and increasing its nuclear stockpile and missile silos.
  • The U.S. is questioning the sufficiency of computer simulations as substitutes for real testing.
• Decline of arms control mechanisms:
  • Russia’s withdrawal from key treaties such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has eroded confidence in global arms control.
  • The stability of the nuclear order is increasingly based on temporary convenience rather than shared conviction.

India’s Nuclear Policy - Restraint and Responsibility:

• Legacy of 1998 and strategic maturity:
  • Since Pokhran-II (1998), India’s voluntary moratorium symbolized strategic restraint and credible minimum deterrence (CMD).
  • This stance facilitated international legitimacy, civil nuclear cooperation, and the lifting of sanctions.
• Foundations of India’s doctrine: Based on CMD and No First Use (NFU), facilitating balanced moral restraint with operational readiness, enhancing India’s image as a responsible nuclear power.

Emerging Challenges to Credibility:

• Technological obsolescence:
  • India’s warhead designs are validated only on 1998 data.
  • New platforms like Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and potential multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) demand greater assurance of yield, miniaturisation, and reliability.
• Limitations of simulation and subcritical tests:
  • Computer modelling extends knowledge but cannot replace empirical testing.
  • Even advanced powers like the U.S. express doubts about relying solely on simulations, raising greater uncertainty for India with fewer test data points.
• Evolving strategic environment:
  • China’s expanding arsenal and Pakistan’s tactical diversification shift regional deterrence dynamics.
  • Unilateral restraint could isolate India from future arms-control frameworks. 

Reassessing Restraint - Strategic, Not Reckless:

• Need for flexibility:
  • Strategic autonomy demands adaptability rather than rigid adherence to restraint.
  • Re-evaluation does not mean rushing to test, but preparing for a world where others might.
• Scientific and limited testing: If testing becomes unavoidable, it should be -
  • Underground, scientific, and validation-oriented, not demonstrative.
  • Designed to ensure credibility and deterrence perception.
• Preserving moral and diplomatic capital:
  • India’s moral authority as a responsible power must remain intact.
  • The goal should be readiness with restraint, maintaining testing capability without prematurely using it.

Ethical and Political Dimensions:

• Restraint without verification may weaken deterrence confidence in a democracy.
• India must ensure transparency, informed debate, and public consensus on nuclear strategy.
• Strategic maturity now lies in reviewing old promises under new realities, not in clinging to outdated assumptions.

Way Forward:

• Strategic review: Conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the nuclear doctrine, testing policy, and technological needs in light of new global realities.
• Technological modernisation: Invest in advanced simulation, materials research, and subcritical testing infrastructure to maintain readiness.
• Diplomatic engagement: Reinforce India’s stance as a responsible nuclear state while asserting the right to ensure deterrence credibility.
• Public and parliamentary debate: Foster informed national discussion on deterrence, technology, and moral responsibility.
• Conditional flexibility: Keep the option of testing open under controlled, ethical, and strategic parameters if compelled by external shifts.

Conclusion:

• India’s nuclear restraint since 1998 has exemplified maturity, responsibility, and confidence.
• However, in a world where major powers are reconsidering self-restraint, strategic flexibility within moral bounds becomes essential.
• India must ensure its deterrent remains not only moral and legitimate, but also technically credible and strategically relevant.
• Strategic maturity now lies not in denial of change, but in preparedness for it.