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Corruption and Prior Sanction — Case of a Divided House
Jan. 19, 2026

Context

  • The split verdict delivered by Justices B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan in Centre for Public Interest Litigation (CPIL) v. Union of India marks a significant moment in India’s constitutional and anti-corruption
  • The dispute concerns Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which bars inquiry or investigation into allegations against public servants for decisions taken in the discharge of official duties without prior sanction of the appropriate government.
  • The controversy revives longstanding questions regarding the balance between shielding honest officials and preserving investigative independence.

Historical and Legal Context

  • The conflict surrounding Section 17A follows earlier judicial interventions against executive control over corruption investigations.
  • The Single Directive, which required government approval before investigating senior bureaucrats, was struck down in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998).
  • The judgment emphasised that the rule of law, equality before law, and protection against the politician-bureaucrat nexus demand insulation of investigative agencies from executive interference.
  • Parliament later reintroduced a similar threshold through Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, enacted via the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
  • In Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI (2014), the Supreme Court invalidated Section 6A, declaring differential investigative thresholds for senior officials discriminatory and violative of Article 14.
  • The Court reiterated that however high you may be, the law is above you, underscoring the principle of accountability irrespective of official rank.
  • Section 17A of the PC Act, inserted in 2018, extended the protective threshold from senior bureaucrats to all public servants.
  • Critics argue that this framework suppresses corruption detection and conflicts with Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014), which mandates FIR registration upon disclosure of a cognisable offence.
  • The government defended Section 17A as a safeguard against frivolous complaints and a necessary measure for administrative confidence and policy stability.

The Competing Judicial Views

  • Justice Nagarathna’s Position: Section 17A is Unconstitutional
    • Justice Nagarathna held that Section 17A imposes an impermissible barrier to initial inquiry and thus protects the corrupt.
    • The vice lies not in who grants approval but in the requirement of prior sanction itself.
    • For her, Section 17A revives protections previously rejected and undermines transparency, probity, and the demands of the rule-based governance.
    • She identified structural conflicts of interest: the government both oversees the accused officials and grants approval for investigations, enabling a shared departmental interest to deny sanction.
    • The arrangement promotes an institutional nexus that discourages scrutiny and allows wrongdoing to remain unchecked.
  • Justice Viswanathan’s Position: Section 17A is Constitutional with Safeguards
    • Justice Viswanathan agreed that vesting approval power in the government would be unconstitutional but viewed prior sanction as legitimate to prevent policy paralysis and shield honest decision-makers from vexatious complaints.
    • The constitutional defect lies in placement, not existence. He proposed that the Lokpal, conceived as an independent anti-corruption authority, could serve as an external filter.
    • The Lokpal Act and PC Act operate in the same normative field, as both incorporate mechanisms for screening, accountability, and protection against misuse, allowing an institutional equilibrium that balances governance and scrutiny.

The Core Constitutional Disagreement and Broader Implications

  • The Core Constitutional Disagreement
    • The core disagreement centres on whether prior investigative filters are impermissible barriers or permissible institutional checks if independent.
    • Justice Nagarathna rejects any pre-investigation threshold as inconsistent with earlier jurisprudence, while Justice Viswanathan endorses a hybrid model where an independent authority mitigates abuse while preventing executive veto.
  • Broader Implications and the Way Forward
    • The dispute engages three constitutional concerns: separation of powers, anti-corruption capability, and administrative efficiency.
    • The resolution will shape India’s state accountability
    • Excessive investigative insulation promotes impunity, whereas unmediated investigative power risks bureaucratic hesitation and diminished state capacity in economic and administrative fields.

Conclusion

  • The split verdict in CPIL v. Union of India illustrates a constitutional struggle to balance governance, integrity, and oversight within the modern administrative state.
  • A larger Bench of the Supreme Court will now determine whether investigative autonomy, filtered scrutiny, or an institutional hybrid best reflects constitutional commitments to democracy and the rule of law.

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