Context

• The participation of Gen Z in electoral politics has emerged as an important democratic question in India.
• Their apparent political disengagement is often interpreted as evidence of apathy or anti-political attitudes.
• However, the deeper issue is whether young people have been systematically deprived of the institutional spaces through which political consciousness develops.
• The argument centres on the need to restore campus democracy, particularly elected students’ councils and student unions, as an important foundation for democratic citizenship.

Is Gen Z Really Apolitical?

• Gen Z is frequently portrayed as being preoccupied with the present, less interested in traditional political institutions and more influenced by social media and immediate issues.
• Yet being apolitical is not necessarily political neutrality. Withdrawal from organised politics can itself strengthen existing political structures because it leaves important decisions to others.
• The central argument, therefore, is not to blame young people for their apparent disengagement. Rather, it is to recognise that political participation requires institutional opportunities.
• Young citizens need spaces where they can debate, organise, negotiate differences and collectively articulate demands.

Gradual Depoliticisation

• The process of depoliticisation has intensified since the 1990s, alongside the expansion of neoliberal economic thinking.
• In this framework, the citizen increasingly becomes a consumer, while social problems are converted into individual responsibilities.
• Unemployment, inadequate housing and economic insecurity may consequently be understood as personal failures rather than structural problems requiring collective political solutions.
• This weakens solidarity and makes collective mobilisation more difficult.
• Another important feature is the shrinking of the temporal horizon.
• The culture of rapid consumption, instant gratification and social-media-driven attention encourages what can be described as nano impulsiveness, a tendency to respond immediately to events rather than develop sustained political programmes.
• This environment can make young citizens particularly vulnerable to personality-driven politics, manufactured consent and emotionally charged nationalism.

The Institutional Vacuum

• Universities are not merely places where academic qualifications are acquired; they can also function as training grounds for democratic citizenship.
• Student elections teach young people how to campaign, debate, negotiate, organise, represent constituencies and accept electoral outcomes.
• They also provide an environment in which issues such as education, employment and social justice can be discussed collectively.
• The suppression of campus politics in several States has therefore removed an important channel through which political consciousness historically developed.
• The contrast with Keralam, where student-union elections remain a regular feature, illustrates how institutional participation can sustain political engagement.

A Revival: The Summer of 2026

• The Jantar Mantar protests over irregularities in NEET-UG provide an important counterpoint to the assumption that Gen Z is inherently apolitical.
• Thousands of young people mobilised around an issue directly affecting their educational and professional futures.
• Their mobilisation demonstrated several distinctive features of contemporary youth politics. Protesters used peer-to-peer Bluetooth mesh networks to communicate despite Internet restrictions, established a mobile library and attracted participation from millennials.
• Technology was therefore not merely a source of distraction; it became an instrument of political organisation.
• The protests suggest that Gen Z does possess political consciousness but may require issues that directly connect with its lived experiences and institutional mechanisms through which that consciousness can be sustained.

Why Student Politics Matters?

• Student politics can transform individual grievances into collective democratic demands.
• A student concerned about examination irregularities may initially act out of personal interest, but collective organisation can broaden the issue into questions of transparency, accountability, educational justice and governance.
• Campus democracy can also weaken identities based exclusively on caste, religion or ethnicity by creating alternative forms of political solidarity around shared concerns such as education and employment.
• Critics argue that student politics causes disruption and interferes with education.
• Yet eliminating political activity altogether can produce a different danger: campuses may create technically skilled individuals without cultivating independent, questioning and democratically engaged citizens. 

From Political Apathy to Democratic Agency

• The crucial lesson is that political disengagement should not automatically be interpreted as political indifference.
• Young people may reject established political institutions while remaining deeply concerned about issues affecting their lives.
• The challenge is therefore to convert spontaneous mobilisation into sustained democratic participation.
• Student councils, campus debates, unions and other representative institutions can provide this bridge. 

Conclusion

• The apparent political apathy of Gen Z should be understood within the broader context of institutional depoliticisation, neoliberal individualism and the decline of collective spaces.
• The Jantar Mantar mobilisation demonstrates that young Indians can rapidly organise when an issue resonates with their aspirations and grievances.
• India therefore needs to move beyond lamenting youth apathy and instead restore the institutional conditions that nurture political consciousness.
• Elected student councils and democratic campus institutions can help transform young people from passive consumers of political narratives into active democratic citizens.

Context

• Rapid digitalisation is generating enormous quantities of electronic waste (e-waste) as governments and companies replace computers, servers, networking equipment and storage systems.
• These discarded devices contain copper, aluminium, gold, silver, palladium and critical minerals.
• Recovering these materials through urban mining can reduce dependence on virgin mining, strengthen domestic supplies and lower import dependence.
• However, achieving this potential requires looking beyond immediate financial costs. 

Urban Mining and the Circular Economy

• Urban mining involves recovering valuable materials from discarded products rather than extracting them from the earth.
• As economies increasingly depend on electronics, batteries, renewable energy and advanced manufacturing, e-waste can become an important secondary source of strategic materials.
• Its benefits include reduced virgin mining, lower import dependence, stronger supply-chain resilience, critical-mineral recovery, safer hazardous-waste management and domestic industrial development.
• Thus, e-waste should be treated not merely as waste but as a resource within a circular economy.

The Long Chain of Recycling

• Advanced e-waste recycling requires collection, segregation, secure data destruction, refurbishment, material recovery, environmentally compliant processing and traceable supply chains.
• These processes involve significant costs. The problem is that public and private procurement often prioritises the lowest visible cost.
• Resale value and immediate savings are easily measured, whereas environmental protection, cybersecurity, mineral recovery and industrial capability are long-term benefits.
• Every decision therefore creates two balance sheets.

The Financial Balance Sheet

• The Strategic Balance Sheet
  • This captures longer-term consequences such as resource security, environmental sustainability, public health, industrial capability, supply-chain resilience and national competitiveness.
  • Good governance requires both to be considered together.
• Why Lowest Cost Can Become Expensive?
  • Selecting a recycler solely on the basis of resale value can create hidden risks.
  • Organisations must consider whether sensitive data is securely destroyed, whether usable equipment is refurbished and whether critical minerals are recovered efficiently.
  • Poor recycling can produce pollution, health costs, cybersecurity risks and reputational damage.
  • Failure to recover valuable materials can increase import dependence, while inadequate domestic recycling capacity can create strategic vulnerability.
  • Therefore, the cheapest transaction is not necessarily the cheapest long-term outcome.

Lessons from Solar Energy

• Solar power demonstrates the importance of strategic investment. Fifteen years ago, solar struggled to compete with conventional electricity on cost.
• Early investments were criticised as expensive, yet technological learning, economies of scale and manufacturing expansion transformed solar into one of the world's most competitive energy sources.
• Urban mining could follow a similar trajectory.
• Investment in recycling infrastructure may appear costly initially but can create technological expertise, manufacturing capacity and resource security that become increasingly valuable as demand for critical minerals rises.

What Organisations Must Ask?

• Governments and businesses should ask:
  • Is sensitive data securely destroyed?
  • Can equipment be refurbished before recycling?
  • How efficiently are critical minerals recovered?
  • Is processing environmentally compliant?
  • Is the supply chain traceable?
  • Does the recycler have adequate technological capability?
  • What are the long-term economic and strategic consequences?
• Such questions encourage life-cycle costing, which measures the broader costs and benefits of an asset throughout its useful life. 

Challenge and The Path Forward

• Challenge: Environmental Costs Are Economic Costs
  • Environmental damage eventually becomes an economic burden through health-care expenditure, remediation costs, compliance expenses and lost productivity.
  • Similarly, resource depletion can produce import dependence, while weak domestic capabilities can create strategic vulnerability.
  • Costs excluded from today's transaction are often merely transferred to governments, businesses, citizens or future generations rather than eliminated.
• The Way Forward: Procurement as Industrial Policy
  • Public procurement can become an instrument of industrial policy.
  • Instead of asking which option is cheapest, governments should consider which option delivers the greatest long-term public value.
  • Many countries are adopting life-cycle costing and value-based procurement for this reason.
  • The same approach can improve Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) systems.
  • Rewarding traceability, recovery efficiency and technological capability rather than merely the cheapest compliance certificate can encourage investment in advanced recycling.

Conclusion

• India's discarded electronics can become either a strategic national resource or an environmental liability.
• Capturing their value requires changing how economic decisions are evaluated.
• Responsible procurement, life-cycle costing, advanced recycling, secure data destruction, refurbishment, traceability and critical-mineral recovery can transform e-waste management into an important pillar of India's resource security and industrial strategy.
• Every invoice records a price, but every decision creates a longer-term balance sheet.
• The real question is therefore not simply what costs less today, but which decision leaves behind the smallest unpaid bill for tomorrow.

Why in News?

• More than 76 years after the Constitution came into force, the provision (Article 124(3)) allowing a “distinguished jurist” to be appointed directly as a Supreme Court judge has never been used.
• Speaking at the 13th convocation of National Law University Delhi recently, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan described this as an “unused mandate” that requires serious consideration.
• He argued that bringing distinguished jurists from legal academia and scholarship could diversify the Supreme Court Bench.
• It could strengthen the SC’s ability to address public law and constitutional questions, and reduce excessive dependence on narrow technicalities.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Constitutional Provision - Article 124(3)
• Why Was the Jurist Route Introduced?
• Who Is a “Distinguished Jurist”?
• Why Has the Provision Remained Unused?
• Why Revive the Provision?
• The Institutional Challenge

Constitutional Provision - Article 124(3):

• Three routes to the Supreme Court:
  • Article 124(3) provides that a person can become a Supreme Court judge if they are an Indian citizen and -
    • Have been a High Court judge for at least five years;
    • Have been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years; or
    • Are, in the opinion of the President, a “distinguished jurist.”
  • The first two routes have traditionally been used. Most Supreme Court judges are elevated from the High Courts, while a smaller number are appointed directly from the Bar. The third route has never been exercised.
• High Court provision:
  • Article 217 deals with appointment of High Court judges.
  • During the Emergency, the 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) introduced a similar provision for appointing distinguished jurists to High Courts.
  • However, this provision was subsequently removed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment (1978). 

Why Was the Jurist Route Introduced?

• The provision originated during the Constituent Assembly debates on May 24, 1949.
• H. V. Kamath - Broaden the talent pool:
  • H.V. Kamath argued that Supreme Court appointments should not be confined exclusively to judges and practising advocates.
  • The Constitution should permit persons possessing “outstanding legal and juristic learning”, even if they had never practised in court.
  • He cited the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an example of a judicial institution drawing upon wider legal expertise.
• Ananthasayanam Ayyangar - Need for constitutional expertise:
  • Ayyangar supported the proposal, observing that practising lawyers may not necessarily encounter the complex constitutional and public-law questions routinely dealt with by a constitutional court.
• B.R. Ambedkar: He did not oppose the principle. His concern was primarily with the terminology—particularly whether “distinguished” was the appropriate word. The provision was ultimately adopted.

Who Is a “Distinguished Jurist”?

• The Constitution does not define the term.
• Broadly, it can encompass persons with exceptional expertise in legal practice, teaching, research or jurisprudence, including eminent legal academics who may lack conventional courtroom experience.
• However, India presents an institutional difficulty - Bar Council rules generally restrict full-time law teachers from simultaneously practising law.
• Consequently, outstanding academics may not possess the litigation experience traditionally associated with judicial appointments. 

Why Has the Provision Remained Unused?

• Perceived lack of suitable candidates: Successive governments and, later, the judicial collegium may have believed that Indian legal academia has not produced candidates with sufficient depth and distinction for appointment to the SC
• Lack of serious exploration: An alternative explanation is that neither the government nor the collegium has seriously explored the constitutional avenue.
• Problem reinforced by the present collegium system:
  • Although Article 124(3) refers to the President's opinion, contemporary Supreme Court appointments are initiated through the Supreme Court collegium.
  • Therefore, a distinguished jurist would ordinarily need to be identified and recommended by the collegium before the government processes the appointment.

Why Revive the Provision?

• Justice Bhuyan's argument goes beyond simply increasing the number of potential candidates.
• A distinguished jurist could -
  • Diversify the composition of the Supreme Court Bench;
  • Bring stronger expertise in constitutional and public law;
  • Introduce perspectives from legal scholarship and academia;
  • Enrich judicial reasoning beyond narrowly technical questions;
  • Strengthen the Court's capacity to deal with increasingly complex constitutional, institutional and socio-legal issues.
• Thus, Article 124(3) can potentially serve as a mechanism for bringing specialised legal knowledge into India's highest constitutional court.

The Institutional Challenge:

• The larger issue is not merely whether India has eminent jurists, but how they should be identified and appointed.
• The absence of a transparent, accepted definition of “distinguished jurist”, combined with the predominance of the collegium system, creates uncertainty over -
  • Who qualifies?
  • Who identifies the candidate?
  • What criteria are applied?
  • How independence and merit are protected?
• The experience of legal scholar Upendra Baxi, who was reportedly considered for judicial elevation but was never appointed, illustrates how the jurist route has remained largely theoretical.

Why in the News?

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has adopted the Bishkek Declaration at its 26th summit.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About SCO (Background, Members, Objectives)
• News Summary (Key Highlights of the Bishkek Declaration)

About the SCO

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic and security grouping. It has ten member states:
  • Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
• India became a full member in 2017. The organisation marked 25 years at the Bishkek summit, making it one of the largest regional groupings by population and geographical spread.
• The SCO's core focus has traditionally been on combating what it calls the "three evils", terrorism, separatism and extremism, alongside cooperation in trade, connectivity and cultural exchange.

News Summary

• The 2026 Bishkek SCO summit was the 26th meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, held from 31 August to 1 September in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
• The Bishkek Declaration was signed by the leaders of all member states, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Terrorism

• The declaration strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and emphasised that double standards in the fight against terrorism are unacceptable.
• Member states called on the international community to combat terrorism, including the cross-border movement of terrorists, with the UN playing a central role.
• This was to be achieved by fully implementing relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in accordance with the UN Charter and principles of international law.
• Reaffirming their commitment to combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, the members emphasised the inadmissibility of attempts to exploit terrorist, separatist and extremist groups for selfish purposes.

Cyber and Information Security

• The declaration noted the importance of countering the use of the internet for terrorist, separatist and extremist purposes.
• Member states agreed to strengthen coordination in the areas of international information security, information protection, and combating new types of crime.

West Asia

• The statement expressed deep concern over developments in West Asia and advocated a political and diplomatic resolution to the conflict.
• Reaffirming support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, member states advocated resolution of the conflict solely through political and diplomatic means, and welcomed all efforts aimed at de-escalating the situation.
• The declaration also condoled the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader.

Global Governance

• The SCO countries advocated reform and improvement of the system of global governance and regulation.
• They also stated adherence to a policy that excludes bloc-based and confrontational approaches to resolving issues of international and regional development, favouring peaceful resolution of disagreements between states.

India's Message at the Summit

• Prime Minister Modi's address focused on three themes: the spillover effects of conflict, terrorism, and connectivity.
• Conflict Has No Borders
  • PM Modi told the summit that the crisis in West Asia has shown that a conflict in one region does not remain confined there. He noted that it affects global energy security, maritime trade and supply chains.
  • He observed that the Global South bears the brunt of these consequences, and reiterated India's consistent position that the resolution of all tensions and conflicts is possible only through dialogue and diplomacy, not on the battlefield.
  • The remarks came as the war in West Asia, which began in February 2026 with US and Israeli attacks on Iran, entered its sixth month.
• On Terrorism
  • PM Modi described terrorism as a grave challenge for all of humanity and argued that the response cannot be limited to an "action-reaction" mindset.
  • He called for dismantling the entire ecosystem of terror financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, and said member states must speak in one voice to declare that there is no room for double standards on the issue.
  • He added that countries which use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and provide shelter and support to terrorists must be sent a strong message that terrorism cannot be a strategic asset for anyone.
• On Connectivity
  • Underlining the need for robust and reliable connectivity, PM Modi said India supports all initiatives that connect markets, facilitate trade and open new avenues for growth.
  • He stressed, however, that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations is paramount in such endeavours, describing this as the core spirit of the SCO Charter.

India's Vision: Security, Connectivity, Opportunity

• PM Modi recalled India's three pillars for the SCO: S for Security, C for Connectivity, and O for Opportunity.
• Noting the grouping's 25-year record, he said a solid foundation for cooperation had been laid and the goal for the next 25 years should be to translate cooperation into tangible results.
• India has launched several initiatives within the SCO framework, including a Start-up Forum, a Young Authors' Conclave and a Young Scientists' Forum.
• The first session of the SCO Civilizational Dialogue Forum, proposed by India last year, will be held in India this year.

Why in news?

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has passed two more orders against India in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) dispute — ruling that India's decision to hold the Treaty in "abeyance" is impermissible, and directing India to halt construction at the Ratle Hydroelectric Project.

India rejected the Court's legitimacy entirely, setting the stage for a prolonged, unresolved standoff.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Latest Rulings
• Why India Rejects the Court?
• Why the Court's Orders Carry No Real Force?
• Pakistan's Limited Options Going Forward
• India's Strategic Response
• Sharing Water Without a Treaty

The Latest Rulings

• The PCA ruled India's decision to put the Treaty in abeyance was not permissible under the Treaty or international law — meaning the Treaty remains fully in force.
• It directed India to halt construction at the Ratle Hydroelectric Project until the technical dispute is resolved.
• This is the fourth award from the Court, all favouring Pakistan.
• The Court, constituted in September 2022, has previously declared itself competent to adjudicate and held its decisions "final and binding".
• With this order, the Court has likely completed its work, having addressed all issues raised by Pakistan.

Why India Rejects the Court?

• India calls the Court illegally-constituted, alleging it was set up by the World Bank in breach of Treaty terms.
• A neutral expert had already been appointed to adjudicate the same issue; the Treaty does not permit parallel resolution processes.
• India refused to appoint its two arbitrators; the Court nonetheless proceeded with two arbitrators appointed by Pakistan and three "umpires" nominated by Treaty-specified institutions.
• India maintains its decision to hold the IWT in abeyance remains in force, rejecting the Court's award outright.

Why the Court's Orders Carry No Real Force?

• The PCA has no enforcement mechanism — its orders cannot compel material change given India's firm rejection.
• For Pakistan, however, the orders remain valuable diplomatic ammunition to raise the issue at international forums and build a domestic narrative.

Pakistan's Limited Options Going Forward

• Best case for Pakistan: Get the UN Security Council to pass a resolution against India, framing the dispute as a security issue (Pakistan is a non-permanent UNSC member for four more months).
• Alternative: Persuade the Security Council or UN General Assembly to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
• Both scenarios are far-fetched — India's greater diplomatic clout at the UN makes such moves unlikely to succeed.
• Pakistan's fallback option: sustained narrative-building portraying India as a treaty-violator.

India's Strategic Response

• Primary focus: expeditious completion of projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to fully utilise its Treaty-permitted rights.
  • Pursuing eight infrastructure projects worth ₹50,000 crore in Jammu and Kashmir.
  • One project — diverting Chenab waters to the Beas — exceeds Treaty provisions, which prohibit inter-basin transfer.
• India disengaged from the neutral expert process last year (set up at its own request) to avoid appearing to still operate under the Treaty.
• It continues sharing hydrological data with Pakistan, but only via the High Commission in Islamabad — not through the Permanent Indus Commission.
• India has linked the Treaty's abeyance to Pakistan's continued support for cross-border terrorism.
• It has proposed renegotiating the Treaty on a strictly bilateral basis, without third-party involvement (e.g., World Bank) — a condition Pakistan is unlikely to accept.

Sharing Water Without a Treaty

• The deadlock appears unresolvable in the near term; rivers will likely continue flowing without a formal agreement.
• This is not unprecedented — India shares rivers with China, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar, mostly without formal water-sharing treaties.
• Abeyance ≠ stopping water flow: India cannot physically halt flows even if it wished to; Pakistan continues receiving water as before, and will continue to do so even after India completes its western river projects.
• Pakistan's water stress stems primarily from inefficient water management, not from Indian action.
• The uncertainty may actually push Pakistan toward better water management practices and storage infrastructure.

Conclusion

The Indus Waters Treaty dispute has reached a practical stalemate: the Court of Arbitration's unenforceable rulings favour Pakistan on paper, but India's firm rejection and infrastructural push on the western rivers signal that it treats the Treaty as effectively defunct.

With renegotiation unlikely and international escalation improbable, transboundary water-sharing may continue informally, as it does with India's other neighbours.

Why in news?

A "shuddhikaran" (purification) ritual performed at Haldwani's Ramlila ground — two days after senior political leader addressed a rally there — has triggered a controversy over whether the act amounts to "untouchability" under law.

The episode raises a deeper constitutional question: does law recognise untouchability even when there is no denial of entry, but a "purification" of a place after a Dalit person has used it?

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What the Constitution and Law Prohibit?
• Supreme Court's Interpretation: Sukanya Shantha v Union of India (2024)
• Rajasthan High Court Precedent: Surya Narayan Choudhary v State of Rajasthan (1988)
• What Would Establish Untouchability in the Haldwani Case?

What the Constitution and Law Prohibit?

• Article 17 declares "untouchability" abolished, forbids its practice "in any form," and makes enforcement of any disability arising from it a punishable offence. The Constitution does not define "untouchability".
• The Supreme Court has held Article 17 is enforceable against non-State actors as well.
• Parliament operationalised Article 17 through the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 after a 1976 amendment.
• The Act penalises preaching and practice of untouchability, and enforcement of disabilities — covering denial of temple entry, social disabilities and discrimination in public facilities.
• Section 7(1)(d) specifically punishes insulting a Scheduled Caste member "on the ground of untouchability" — but the insult must be connected to untouchability, not merely humiliating.

Supreme Court's Interpretation: Sukanya Shantha v Union of India (2024)

• Case involved striking down caste-discriminatory provisions in prison manuals.
• Court linked untouchability to the caste system's notions of "purity and pollution", used historically to reinforce caste hierarchy.
• It held that the absence of a constitutional definition does not restrict Article 17's scope, since discrimination manifests through "manifold complexities" of social life.
• Key principle laid down was: "There cannot be any stigma attached to the existence, touch or presence of any person."
• This extends Article 17 beyond physical exclusion to discriminatory treatment based on touch or presence.

Rajasthan High Court Precedent: Surya Narayan Choudhary v State of Rajasthan (1988)

• The case was concerned with discrimination against Dalit devotees at the Shrinathji temple, Nathdwara.
• Dalits were permitted temple entry only after a purification process.
• High Court held this was an additional discriminatory condition not applied to other devotees.
• It directed the practice be discontinued, holding it violative of Articles 14, 15 and 17.
• Key distinction from Haldwani: At Nathdwara, purification was a precondition for entry; at Haldwani, the ritual occurred after use of the venue, and its cause is disputed.
• Hence, this precedent doesn't directly decide the Haldwani case, but establishes that caste-specific ritual purification as a condition of access violates Article 17.

Distinguishing from the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

• Article 17/PCR (Protection of Civil Rights Act) Act must be distinguished from the separate criminal regime under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
• Section 3(1)(r): Punishes intentional insult/intimidation of an SC/ST member with intent to humiliate, in a place within public view, by a non-SC/ST person.
• Hitesh Verma v State of Uttarakhand (2020): Not every insult to an SC/ST person attracts this provision — the insult must be connected to the person's caste identity.
• Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v State (NCT of Delhi) (2026): Reiterated that "public view" is an essential ingredient for the offence.

What Would Establish Untouchability in the Haldwani Case?

• The determining factor is evidence of a caste-based connection — whether the venue was seen as needing cleansing because of caste-based notions of pollution attached to Kharge's touch or presence.
• If such a connection exists, the reasoning in Sukanya Shantha and Surya Narayan Choudhary becomes directly relevant.
• If the ritual was for reasons unconnected to caste, mere timing after the rally does not by itself establish untouchability.
• The word "shuddhikaran" alone cannot answer this question — the legal test is the underlying connection to caste-based pollution, not the label or timing of the act.

Conclusion

Article 17's abolition of untouchability extends beyond physical exclusion to caste-based notions of purity and pollution attached to a person's touch or presence, as clarified in Sukanya Shantha.

Whether a specific act — such as the Haldwani ritual — constitutes untouchability ultimately turns on demonstrable caste-based intent, not on ritual terminology or coincidental timing.